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I. INTRODUCTION
Our search to find ways to move quickly to equal opportunity led to
the development of what we now call affirmative action. The pur-
pose of affirmative action is to give our nation a way to finally
address the systemic exclusion of individuals of talent, on the basis of
their gender or race, from opportunities to develop, perform, achieve
and contribute. Affirmative action is an effort to develop a system-
atic approach to open the doors of education, employment, and busi-
ness development opportunities to qualified individuals who happen
to be members of groups that have experienced long-standing and
persistent discrimination ....
What would the country look like without affirmative action?
According to its opponents, a gentle notching downward would take
place in [B]lack America: [B]lack students who now go to Harvard
Law School would go to Michigan instead and do very well; [B]lack
students at Michigan would go to Louisiana State, and so on. The net
impact would be small .... The other possibility is that there would
be an enormous decrease in [B]lack representation everywhere in
white-collar (and also blue-collar) America, with a big, noticeable
depressive effect on [B]lack income, employment, home-ownership
and education levels.2
The most disturbing thing about [Justice] Thomas is not his conclu-
sions, but his twisted reasoning and bilious rage. In his written opin-
ions, he begins with premises that no self-respecting [BIlack would
disagree with, then veers off into a neverland of color-blind philoso-
phizing in which all race-based policies, from Jim Crow laws
designed to oppress minorities to affirmative-action measures seeking
to assist them, are conflated into one morally and legally pernicious
whole.
3
Still, as much as I loathe affirmative action-for the indignity and
Faustian bargain it presents to minorities, for the hypocrisy and
shameless self-congratulation it brings out in its white supporters-I
must admit that it troubles me to see its demise so glibly urged from
1. Excerpts From Clinton Talk on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1995, at A10.
2. Nicolas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, June
11, 1995, at 35.
3. Jack E. White, Uncle Tom Justice, TIME, June 26, 1995, at 36.
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the political right . . . . Discrimination does not justify preferential
treatment, but I want to know that the person who stands with me
against preferences understands the problem that inspired them.'
"We are at the end of a second Reconstruction," said Janette Wilson,
a black lawyer and former executive director of Operation PUSH, a
Chicago-based civil rights organization. "The recent decisions say
that the Supreme Court has joined together with the Newt Gingrich
faction of Congress, and war is being declared on African-Americans
and poor people economically, academically and now politically."5
"When I was an undergraduate at Yale, there were all these looks that
said, 'Why are you here?"' said Kristin Weber, a [B]lack first-year
Berkeley law student. "When I made it through and graduated with
honors, I had people come up and say they didn't know I was so
smart. Well, I knew I was smart. There's a lot of hostility that's
playing out in this whole debate over affirmative action. "6
Given that history, it is absurd to argue, as many critics do, that
affirmative action has placed African-Americans under suspicion of
incompetence, by propelling them into positions they do not rightly
deserve. Bred into this country's bones, the presumption that
[B]lacks are inherently less "qualified" would be a driving force in
any case. An alternative view of affirmative action is that it breaks
down occupational apartheid, the notion that elite jobs are for white
folks only. The process is wrenching, but how could it be
otherwise?7
While that state's Republican Governor, Pete Wilson, hailed as a
"historic achievement" the elimination of affirmative action at the
nine-campus University of California, academicians expressed con-
cern ... that minority enrollment at the system's elite Berkeley and
Los Angeles campuses would decline significantly. 8
4. Shelby Steele, Affirmative Action Must Go, N.Y. TiMEs, March 1, 1995, at AI5. Glenn
Loury echoes this theme:
Giving out government contracts on the basis of sex or skin color of the (often
wealthy) owners of businesses is discrimination. Turning away better qualified
whites from a state law school in favor of (B]lacks from richer families who are not
state residents is discrimination. Presuming that immigrants from Latin America are
more entitled to preferential treatment than those from Eastern Europe is also
discrimination. Exactly which of these practices is the President now committed to
rooting out?
Glenn C. Loury, Let's Get On With Dr. King's Idea, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1995, at A9.
5. Steven A. Holmes, As Affirmative Action Ebbs, A Sense of Uncertainty Rises, N.Y.
Tims, July 6, 1995, at Al.
6. Peter Applebome, The Debate on Diversity in California Shifts, N.Y. TiMES, June 4, 1995,
at 2.
7. Brent Staples, The Preswnption of Stupidity: Affirmative Action, Occupational Apartheid,
N.Y. Tirvms, March 5, 1995, at 14.
8. William H. Honan, Admissions Change Will Alter Elite Campuses, Experts Say, N.Y.
TiMEs, July 22, 1995, at 7.
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Q. You've seen the evolution from Negro to [B]lack to African-
American? What is the best thing for [B]lacks to call themselves?
A. White.9
All of the preceding quotations from newspaper and magazine arti-
cles focus on one unifying theme-race in America. We do not live, nor
have we ever lived, in a colorblind nation. We live in a nation blinded
by color. America is in the midst of the Second Deconstruction, t ° a
period of stagnation and retrenchment following thirty years of signifi-
cant gains ushered in by affirmative action. Adopting a judicial posture
eerily reminiscent of its post-Civil War decisions,"1 the United States
Supreme Court held, in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,12 that con-
gressionally enacted benign remedies are subject to strict scrutiny.1
3
Just as state and local governmental initiatives are held to the strict scru-
tiny standard under City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 4 so are feder-
ally enacted programs; white subcontractors must not be discriminated
against when race-conscious remedies are employed. Underlying this
doctrinal shift is the illusory paradigm of colorblindness.
9. Sam Roberts, Conversations/Kenneth B. Clark: An Integrationist to This Day, Believing
All Else Has Failed, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1995, at 7 (emphasis added).
10. "Sometimes referred to as the First and Second Reconstruction, the periods between
1865-1875 and 1957-1968, respectively, mark the zenith of civil rights reform." Bryan K. Fair,
The Acontextual Illusion of a Color-Blind Constitution, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 343, 346 n.17 (1994)
(reviewing ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1994)). Here, "Second
Deconstruction" refers to the twilight period of civil rights reform from 1968 to the present.
Indeed, the Second Deconstruction is quite similar to the white counterrevolution that followed
the First Reconstruction. See generally W.E.B. Du Bols, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA
(Atheneum 1992); EIuC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877 (1988).
11. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of state
laws mandating racial separation); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating the
first two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prescribed discrimination in public
accommodations; the Court concluded that private discrimination was beyond the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (applying the
Slaughter-House Cases and concluding that the right to assemble was not one of the Privileges
and Immunities of national citizenship; this opinion severely diluted the Civil Rights Act of 1870,
which reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and provided for voting rights and criminal penalties
for depriving or conspiring to deprive anyone of their civil rights); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (undermining congressional efforts to nationalize protection of the basic
civil rights of former slaves by declaring that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applied only to a set of narrowly defined rights of national citizenship).
See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-12, at 330 & nn.3,4 (2nd ed.
1988) ("The Supreme Court restrictively construed or simply invalidated much of this legislation,
acting to preserve in law the autonomy that the states had largely lost politically in the wake of the
Civil War."); Bryan K. Fair, Foreword: Rethinking the Colorblindness Model, 13 NAT'L. BLACK
L.J. 1, 30 n.170 (1994).
12. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
13. Id. at 2113 ("[W]e hold ... that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,
state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.").
14. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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In this mythological vision of America, racism and sexism either no
longer exist (or if they do, their manifestations are purely aberrational);
African-Americans and women simply need to work hard and their
efforts will be rewarded by the unerring "fairness" of the meritocracy;
and perhaps most importantly, individual liberty, not group "interests,"
is the hallmark of the American polity. This article takes the view that
nothing could be further from the truth.
15
Part II addresses the inverted reasoning of colorblindness where the
oppressed become the oppressor. Adarand is the first Supreme Court
decision to completely embrace the New Equal Protection. Eschewing
any acknowledgement of the history of race and racism in America, the
Court has created a new suspect class-innocent whites who are injured
by race-conscious remedies. Through an unrealistically acontextual
assessment of racism in America, the principle of colorblindness per-
petuates racial subordination. 6
Notwithstanding the obvious implications of the Adarand decision
on race-conscious remedial efforts, the most alarming aspect of the deci-
sion is its structural realignment of judicial and legislative decisionmak-
ing. Adarand is particularly disturbing; not only is the Court acting as a
superlegislature,' 7 it is also redistributing the boundaries of power. This
is antithetical to a positive view of federalism. Part II advances the the-
ory that the Court has misinterpreted the meaning of Bolling v. Sharpe,18
and in so doing, has eviscerated the traditional institutional boundaries
between Congress, the states, and the Court itself. Consequently, Con-
gress is, in relation to race-conscious remedial efforts to eradicate dis-
15. See, e.g., Andrew Hacker, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL (1992).
16. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1062 (1991); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Frank Cooper, & Lovita Tandy, Foreword: A
New Journal of Color in a "Colorblind" World: Race and Community, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y
REP. 1, 2 (1994) ("We ... need journals of color because 'colorblindness' is currently being
defined in a way that reinforces the social stratification of society."); Fair, supra note 10 at 5; Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 8 (1991); Luke
Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential Treatment: A
Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, II HARv. BLACKLETTER
J. 1, 35 (1994); John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the
Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IowA L. REv. 313, 324 (1994); Herbert 0. Reid, Sr.,
Assault on Affirmative Action: The Delusion of a Color-Blind America, 23 How. L.J. 381, 427-28
(1980).
17. Obviously, there are discrete occasions when the Court has to perform this function. See,
e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II); Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). But see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 74-77 (1980)
(advocating a process-oriented theory of judicial review where the Court intervenes only on those
rare occasions where "discrete and insular minorities," are injured).
18. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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crimination, little more than a city council.' 9 This is the problem of
reverse incorporation.2" Specifically, this Article argues that the Boiling
decision was never meant to limit Congress' section 5 power under the
Fourteenth Amendment as section 1 limits state power.21
Properly understood, Bolling stands for the proposition that Con-
gress-like the states-cannot discriminate. If Congress does discrimi-
nate, then this Fifth Amendment 22 due process violation implicates the
equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation on state power; conversely,
section 5 is a positive grant of legislative power to Congress.23 The two
sections should be interpreted so as not to undermine Congress' power
in eradicating discrimination. Section 5 acknowledges Congress' pri-
macy as the nation's legislature. Thus, the implicit equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation on congressional
power. Moreover, the varying interpretations of the equality embodied
in the Fourteenth Amendment support this view-the only limitation in
the Fourteenth Amendment is a prohibition against discriminatory enact-
ments by the states; there is no limitation on legislative efforts to eradi-
cate subjugation or caste. Thus, Adarand was wrongly decided. The
overarching theme embodied in this discussion is that the Court lacks
the institutional competence to intervene in this area, particularly where
there is scant, if any, evidence of "invidious discrimination" against
white majority interests.
Finally, Part II closes with a discussion and analysis of the Thir-
teenth Amendment.24 "Under a colorblind framework, the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment serves as the font of antidiscrimination law, while the
19. By placing Congress on the same plane as the Richmond City Council in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), the Court has drastically altered the
parameters of institutional power. Indeed, the Court has redefined well-settled notions of
federalism and institutional competence.
20. "'Reverse incorporation,' as the doctrine is sometimes called, purports to subject federal
and state action to identical levels of equal protection scrutiny and therefore would treat Congress
and states as possessing coterminous authority to enact laws implicating equal protection
concerns." Bradford Russell Clark, Note, Judicial Review of Congressional Section Five Action:
The Fallacy of Reverse Incorporation, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1969 (1984). This is a gross
misreading of the Fourteenth Amendment.
21. Section 1. "No State shall ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Section 5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
22. "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
24. Section 1. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States ...." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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[T]hirteenth [A]mendment is reduced to simply prohibiting the reinstitu-
tion of slavery. '"25 But the Thirteenth Amendment certainly means more
than this-the Court itself has stated:
At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure
under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy
whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man
can live. If Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least
this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the
Nation cannot keep.26
The Thirteenth Amendment focuses explicitly on the elimination of
caste, and it moves away from the artificial barriers of state action and
colorblindness. "It helps redefine the issue as one not simply of prevent-
ing racial discrimination, but of achieving racial justice."27
In Part III, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 28 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.,29 and Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,3° are analyzed with a particular
emphasis on the Court's conception of institutional power. Specifically,
this conception inevitably determines the standard of review that the
Court adopts when construing a constitutional challenge to a race-con-
scious remedy. The Court moves from an unarticulated standard of
review rooted in deference to Congress in Fullilove3 1 to strict scrutiny
for state or local race-conscious remedial efforts in Croson32 to an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny for an FCC program in Metro Broadcasting.33
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education is also analyzed to illustrate both
Justice Stevens' forward-looking approach and the Court's arbitrary
treatment of the requirement of discriminatory purpose in equal protec-
tion cases.
Obviously, this jurisprudential terrain is decidedly uneven. How-
Section 2. "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
25. Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 1119.
26. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
27. Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 1120.
28. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
29. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
30. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Metro Broadcasting is also analyzed as a First Amendment case.
Specifically, this Article explores the relationship between diversity and the marketplace of ideas.
Just as regulation of hate speech is not at odds with First Amendment principles when the
overriding concern is the elimination of caste, see Cedric Merlin Powell, The Mythological
Marketplace of Ideas: R.A.V., Mitchell, and Beyond, 12 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 1 (1995), so too
must be congressional attempts at inclusion of diverse viewpoints in the ideological marketplace.
Congress or the FCC should be free to open up the marketplace to views and groups which have
been historically excluded. Indeed, this approach may prove appealing to First Amendment
absolutists.
31. 448 U.S. at 492, 497-16 (Burger, C.J.).
32. 488 U.S. at 504-10 (O'Connor, J.).
33. 497 U.S. at 564-65 (Brennan, J.).
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ever, these decisions can be unified under an intermediate standard of
review. Simply put, if legislative decisions are not motivated by racial
animus, then such decisions should be subject to a less demanding stan-
dard of review than strict scrutiny.34
In the discussion of this constitutional triad, Justice Stevens' opin-
ions are highlighted. His decisions have varied from requiring an exact
fit between congressionally-enacted race-based remedies and injuries to
minorities, 35 to requiring strict scrutiny analysis for states and local gov-
ernmental efforts to remedy past discrimination,36 to a deferential
approach where Congress is concerned with diversity in broadcasting.37
Today, Justice Stevens is the only remaining member of the Metro
Broadcasting majority and his decisions dramatically illustrate the
Court's power to establish and alter institutional boundaries. More
importantly, his decisions illustrate the impact such determinations have
on the ability of governmental entities to address issues of discrimina-
tion. His approach, however, has its shortcomings as well.38 Finally, in
Adarand, Justice Stevens comes full circle analytically and attempts to
address a question the majority glosses over-the scope of congres-
sional power under the Fifth Amendment.39 More specifically, whether
congruence between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments necessarily
means that congressional power (under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment) should be limited in the same way as state power is under
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, Part III offers a critique of the Adarand decision. Justice
Stevens' invocation of "skeptical scrutiny," in dissent,40 is used to ana-
lyze Justice O'Connor's majority opinion. Moreover, the preceding
parts are employed to illustrate the unprincipled constitutional founda-
tion upon which Adarand rests. Although affirmative action is not
extinct under the reasoning in Adarand, there will nevertheless be a
period of affirmative inaction: Clinging to the hollow notion of color-
34. See Fair, supra note 10, at 73-81; infra notes 408-18 and accompanying text.
35. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 540-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 512-16 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring).
38. Justice Stevens favors "forward-looking" approaches to eradicate racism, see Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2120 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting), but disfavors
any attempt to analyze past discriminatory practices which impact current conditions of caste. See
also Croson, 488 U.S. at 511-12, nn.1-2. However, racism does not occur in a time capsule-it is
systemic. Thus, Justice Stevens' approach is only marginally contextual and severely ahistorical.
However, his approach does preserve some level of institutional power for Congress.
39. See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2123-26 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
40. See id. at 2120.
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blindness, governments will simply ignore the continuing effects of past
discrimination.
II. CONCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY
The Court has substantially altered its conception of equality.
Equality no longer means that systems of subordination will not be toler-
ated, it now means that the systemic manifestations of racism will be
ignored in the name of colorblindness. Thus, individualized notions of
liberty displace the moral claims of oppressed groups; Fourteenth
Amendment analysis is doctrinally paralyzed by a futile effort to discon-
nect it from its historical moorings; and contextual analysis is aban-
doned in favor of a fairy-tale depiction of American society. In this
inverted reality play, everyone is already equal-we must avoid consid-
ering race lest we all return to our horrible "past" of racial
discrimination.
A. The Colorblind Myth: The Oppressed Become the Oppressor
Since Justice Blackmun's admonition in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke4 that "[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must
first take account of race,"42 the Court has steadily moved away from
this fundamental notion to the myth of colorblindness. At bottom, this
doctrinal shift is indicative of the Court's conception of equality. "What
separates most of the participants in the debate is not so much the goal
of colorblindness, but rather differing views about the cause of current
inequality and the efficacy of race-blind or race-conscious remedies in
reaching a colorblind future."43 In this context, the jurisprudence of col-
orblindness44 obscures the systemic effects of racism characterizing
caste and other abhorrent byproducts of subordination as "remnants" of
41. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
42. Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J.. dissenting).
43. Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 1064.
44. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[G]ovemment can never
have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past
racial discrimination in the opposite direction."); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) ("At the heart of the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens 'as
individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class."') (quoting
Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris,
463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("The benign purpose of compensating for social disadvantages, whether
they have been acquired by reason of prior discrimination or otherwise, can no more be pursued
by illegitimate means of racial discrimination than can other assertedly benign purposes we have
repeatedly rejected."); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 524 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("And our cases have made clear that the Constitution is wholly neutral in forbidding such racial
discrimination, whatever the race may be of those who are its victims.").
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a distant past. A past that no one wants to remember, but a past whose
current effects continue to deprive both African-Americans and women
of significant societal opportunities.15 Thus, an aspirational goal-col-
orblindness-has supplanted any attempt to realistically assess the ques-
tion of race in America.
The jurisprudence of colorblindness functions on three levels: (i)
as a historical myth advancing the counterintuitive notion that the Civil
War Amendments, the accompanying civil rights enforcement statutes,
and the legislative history of these enactments are devoid of any concep-
tion of race; (ii) as a definitional myth advancing the fallacy that racism
is not systemic, but merely a series of unconnected ihdividual responses
beyond the reach of the ameliorative powers of the courts and legisla-
tures; and (iii) as a rhetorical myth focusing the affirmative action
debate not on the victims of systemic racism and caste, but on a genera-
lized class of "innocents"46 who are arbitrarily punished.
45. The recent Glass Ceiling Commission report provides startling statistics:
A survey of senior-level male managers in Fortune 1000 industrial and Fortune 500
service industries shows that almost 97 percent are white, 0.6 are African American,
0.3 percent are Asian, and 0.4 percent are Hispanic.
African American men and women comprise less than 2.5 percent of total
employment in the top jobs in the private sector. African American men with
professional degrees earn only 79 percent of the amount of their white male
counterparts; African American women with professional degrees earn only 60
percent of what white males earn. African Americans represent a $257 billion
consumer market.
THE FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, THE ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN, GOOD FOR BUSINESS:
MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL 9 (1995).
46. Significantly, a recent study, focusing on the validity of "reverse discrimination" claims,
states:
1. "Reverse discrimination" cases constitute between 1 and 3 per cent of all
discrimination opinions reported during the 1990-1994 period. Of the 3,000 plus
reported opinions, fewer than 100 involved such claims. This finding casts doubt on
the claim that "reverse discrimination" is widespread.
2. A high proportion of the "reverse discrimination" claims are without merit.
Several were brought by whites or males who were less qualified than the females
or minorities who obtained the position.
3. In the six individualized cases where "reverse discrimination" was
established, the court gave appropriate relief.
4. In 12 cases where affirmative action programs, mainly under consent
decrees, were challenged, the programs were upheld or modified. In six cases, the
programs were either invalidated or reexamined.
5. In one case, a decree which was expected to take 5 years to and [sic]
discrimination, actually took 19 years. This and one other case suggest that the task
of ending discrimination may take us longer than we had hoped.
Alfred W. Blumrosen, Draft Report on Reverse Discrimination Commissioned By Labor Depart-
ment: How the Courts are Handling Reverse Discrimination Claims, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA)
No. 56, at D-22 (March 23, 1995), available in 1995 D.L.R. 56 D-22 WL BNA-LB. This report
challenges yet another myth-the myth of entitlement. Specifically, that white males have been
displaced by a stream of incompetents. This is what underlies the argument that "innocents" will
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Relying on the analyses of Professors Fair,47 Gotanda,4 s and Morri-
son,49 this section explores the colorblind myth, and its upside-down,
underlying reasoning that transforms the historically oppressed into the
oppressor.
1. THE HISTORICAL MYTH
Historically, colorblind jurisprudence begins with the elder Justice
Harlan's famous and ironic dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.50 Justice
Harlan articulated the central premise of the American polity and consti-
tutional government: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." 51 Justice Harlan properly
recognized that the Supreme Court has a moral obligation to interpret
the Constitution in a principled manner;52 however, the sentences pre-
ceding the oft-quoted proclamation give the colorblindness principle a
disconcerting resonance:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and
in power. So, I doubt not that it will continue to be for all time, if it
remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of
the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind.53
In analyzing this passage, Professor Tribe notes the underlying ten-
sion in Justice Harlan's dissent:
Perhaps it is anachronistic and even unfair to stress too heavily the
manifest racism in Justice Harlan's full statement. But even for this
late nineteenth-century proponent of white dominance, the color-
blind ideal, it turns out, was only shorthand for the concept that the
Fourteenth Amendment prevents our law from enshrining and perpet-
uating white supremacy. To say that this particular vice is shared,
automatically or presumptively, by race-specific minority set-asides
strikes many as far-fetched.54
be hurt by affirmative action programs. As these figures suggest, the "reverse discrimination"
argument is largely an appeal to emotion rather than a practical reality. See supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
47. See Fair, supra notes 10 & 11.
48. See Gotanda, supra note 16.
49. See Morrison, supra note 16.
50. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 559.
52. See generally RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
53. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
54. Laurence H. Tribe, "In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Color-Blind?,"
20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 201, 203 (1986). Professor Fair views this language as illustrative of
Justice Harlan's understanding that "60 million Whites were in no danger of domination by 8
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In essence, Justice Harlan's conception of colorblindness did not mean
that the Constitution turns a blind eye on race; but rather, that the Con-
stitution embraces the notion that there can never be caste based on
one's status as nonwhite. Race is, indeed, a factor in this analysis. Sig-
nificantly, Plessy embraces two theories-racial subjugation in the
majority opinion55 and the elimination of caste based on Black skin in
Justice Harlan's dissent.56 Both theories are color conscious, not color-
blind. The striking difference between the two theories is how color is
used to fashion a theory of equality. 7
million Blacks. Similarly, 200 million Whites are in no danger of domination from 30 million
Blacks today." Fair, supra note 10, at 2 n.3. I do not think that it is unfair to stress too heavily the
inherently racist undertones in Justice Harlan's dissent, nor do I think as Professor Fair suggests,
that Justice Harlan was merely discussing the numerical disparities between white and Black
populations in 1896. Justice Harlan articulated a theory of white dominance: The white race is
the dominant race and shall "continue to be for all time." While "there is no caste here," there is
certainly the widely held view that Blacks are subordinate to the dominant race. This tension
continues to this day. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 16, at 316 ("Justice Harlan did not allow
colorblindness to prevent him from taking judicial notice of, and some pride in, the enormous
disparities between the Euro-American and African-American communities.").
55. Writing for the majority, Justice Brown concluded:
The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have
been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political, equality or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
56. Analyzing the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Harlan wrote:
These [the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments] notable additions to the
fundamental law were welcomed by the friends of liberty throughout the world.
They removed the race line from our governmental systems. They had, as this
[C]ourt has said, a common purpose, namely, to secure "to a race recently
emancipated, a race that through many generations have been held in slavery, all
the civil rights that the superior race enjoy." They declared, in legal effect, this
[Clourt has further said, "that the law in the states shall be the same for the black
as for the white; shall stand equal before the laws of the states, and, in regard to the
colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color."
Id. at 555-56 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Here, colorblindness means that the color
of a Black person's skin is of no constitutional relevance-the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments were enacted to include Blacks in the national citizenry and to obliterate the vestiges of
slavery. Colorblindness means that the color, "Black," is not the mark of inferiority. The point is
that even Justice Harlan's constitutional metaphor of colorblindness has a distinct recognition of
color. The only way that colorblindness works in reverse-that the Constitution must totally
ignore race-is if the entire historical context of Justice Harlan's dissent is not considered. When
the constitutional proclamation, "Our Constitution is color-blind," is considered in light of Justice
Harlan's complete dissent in Plessy, it is obvious that Justice Harlan was aware that race (color)
should not be used to subjugate; however, he embraced the concept of race being used to eradicate
discrimination. That is, he recognized that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were
designed primarily for the benefit of the oppressed class-Blacks.
57. For the majority, per Justice Brown, color is used to justify the "separate but equal"
doctrine of Plessy:
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The theoretical allure of colorblindness begins with an acontextual
examination of Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy: no mention is made
of Justice Harlan's concern with racial subordination, 8 no reference is
made to how the concept of race shaped his vision of constitutional
equality,5 9 and finally, the statement, "Our Constitution is colorblind" is
transformed into a "restatement of the doctrine of separate but equal. 6 °
Thus, modern colorblindness is at odds with Justice Harlan's conception
of colorblindness.
Conceptually, Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy is an odd place to
trace the historical origins of the jurisprudence of colorblindness. It is as
if one sentence has been pulled from its context, and amplified several
times to produce a contorted and hypertechnical reading of equality.
Professor Fair pinpoints the inside-out reasoning that is inherent in the
colorblindness model:
[T]he colorblindness model preserves "White" rule in the United
States .... Whites have never had to compete equally with Blacks
for access to economic and political power. The Nation's Founding
Fathers gave themselves an original advantage which subsequent
generations of Whites have inherited. Many Whites ignore this sub-
tle socio-economic history and believe that they have "earned" their
economic and political position. They also believe that White racial
hegemony is normative. Application of the transformed colorblind-
It is true that the question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to constitute
a colored person, as distinguished from a white person, is one upon which there is a
difference of opinion in the different states, some holding that any visible admixture
of black blood stamps the person as belonging to the colored race; others that it
depends upon the preponderance of blood; and still others that the predominance of
white blood must only be in the proportion of three fourths.
Id. at 552 (citations omitted). Under this perverted reasoning, Blacks and whites are separated by
the color-line, and one's blood determines whether they are truly included in American society or
separated from it. See Fair, supra note 11, at 33 n.179 ("Plessy was apparently seven-eighths
Caucasian blood and one-eighth African blood. He claimed that his mixture of African blood was
not discernible. He therefore took a vacant seat in the coach for Whites. After he refused an order
to move, Plessy was forcibly ejected and arrested.").
By contrast, Justice Harlan argued against this freakish notion of equality by blood-Blacks
were protected by the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Fair notes:
Justice Harlan argued that while the language of the Fourteenth Amendment
was prohibitory, it also contained: a necessary implication of a positive immunity,
or right, most valuable to the colored race-the right to exemption from unfriendly
legislation against them distinctively as colored-exemptions from legal discrimi-
nations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoy-
ment of rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps toward
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.
Fair, supra note 12, at 34 & n.186.
58. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
60. Fair, supra note 11, at 70. Professor Fair posits that both the colorblindness model and
the "separate but equal" doctrine ignore the reality of caste. Id.
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ness model enshrines the very racial hegemony that Justice Harlan
contended was unconstitutional.6"
Clearly, Justice Harlan's notion of colorblindness was dramatically
different from that espoused by today's Court-Justice Harlan acknowl-
edged that the Civil War Amendments were designed to dismantle a
system of caste based on race.62 Indeed, Justice Harlan's acknowledge-
ment was unavoidable because the Constitution is a pro-slavery docu-
ment.6" Thus, it is not surprising that a series of post-Civil War
amendments were necessary to eradicate Black subjugation.' Underly-
ing Justice Harlan's colorblindness model was a historical analysis.
Unfortunately, this analysis is glaringly absent from the colorblindness
61. Id. at 68.
62. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
63. See Fair, supra note 11, at 20. Professor Fair argues that this conclusion is well-supported
by the works of Professor Derrick Bell and the historian William Wiecek. Bell cites the historian
William Wiecek for compiling the following list of direct and indirect accommodations to slavery
contained in the Constitution:
1. Article I, Section 2: representatives in the House were apportioned among the
states on the basis of population, computed by counting all free persons and three-
fifths of the slaves (the "federal number,"; or "three-fifths" clause);
2. Article I, Section 2, and Article I, Section 9: two clauses requiring, redundantly,
that direct taxes ... be apportioned among the states on the foregoing basis, the
purpose being to prevent Congress from laying a head tax on slaves to encourage
their emancipation;
3. Article I, Section 9: Congress was prohibited from abolishing the international
slave trade to the United States before 1808;
4. Article IV, Section 2: the states were prohibited from emancipating fugitive
slaves, who were to be returned on demand of the master;
5. Article I, Section 8: Congress was empowered to provide for calling up the
states' militias to suppress insurrections, including slave uprisings;
6. Article IV, Section 4: the federal government was obliged to protect the states
against domestic violence, including slave insurrections;
7. Article V: the provisions of Article I, Section 9, clauses I and 4 (pertaining to
the slave trade and direct taxes) were made unamendable;
8. Article I, Section 9, and Article I, Section 10: these two clauses prohibited the
federal government and the states from taxing exports, one purpose being to prevent
them from taxing slavery indirectly by taxing the exported product of slave labor.
Id. at 19 n.108 (quoting DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987)).
64. See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987).
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model articulated by various Justices in Fullilove,65 Croson,66 Metro
Broadcasting,67 and Adarand.68
65. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In Fullilove, the plurality rejected the colorblindness approach. 448
U.S. at 482 ("As a threshold matter, we reject the contention that in the remedial context the
Congress must act in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion."). The advocates of colorblindness in
Fullilove, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, conveniently ignored both the context and history
underlying Justice Harlan's colorblindness paradigm. Citing the language in Justice Harlan's
colorblindness proclamation, Justice Stewart strained to place the federal minority set-aside
program in Fullilove on the same constitutional plane as the segregated railroad cars in Plessy. Id.
at 522-27. This approach obscures the constitutional validity of governmental action to eliminate
discrimination under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Of course, Justice Stewart
never mentioned the purpose of these amendments; he simply took one sentence in Justice
Harlan's Plessy dissent and transformed it into a constitutional principle.
66. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Moving closer to the adoption of colorblindness, Justice O'Connor
in Croson concluded: "While the States and their subdivisions may take remedial action when
they possess evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior
discrimination, they must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some specificity
before they use race-conscious relief." 488 U.S. at 504. Justice O'Connor's concern with "racial
politics," see id. at 495, forced her to embrace a modified notion of colorblindness. That is,
benign remedial measures designed to ameliorate the status of Blacks are inherently suspect, and
must be buttressed by particularized findings of past discrimination. Since "innocent whites" can
be harmed by such measures, a high threshold of constitutional validity must be met. Thus the
suspect classes are inverted-Blacks are now the oppressors and whites are the oppressed. Again,
colorblindness distorts the purpose of the Civil War Amendments, dulling the brightline between
invidious and benign discrimination.
The approach of Justice Scalia is purely colorblind, and even more radical than Justice
O'Connor's modified conception. For Justice Scalia, not only are Blacks practicing racial politics,
id. at 524, but he turns the meaning and import of the Civil War Amendments on their head: "The
Civil War Amendments were designed to 'take away all possibility of oppression by law because
of race or color . I...' d. at 522. Justice Scalia is blind to one important aspect of doctrinal
history-the Civil War Amendments were enacted to fully liberate Blacks. Whites did not need
the Civil War Amendments-they already had political power at the time the amendments were
enacted.
67. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Justice O'Connor, in her Metro Broadcasting dissent, adopted a
colorblind approach that was closer to Justice Scalia's concurrence in Croson: "The FCC has
used race as a proxy for whatever views it believes to be underrepresented in the broadcasting
spectrum. This reflexive or unthinking use of a suspect classification is the hallmark of an
unconstitutional policy." 497 U.S. at 621. Again, race is inherently suspect regardless of how it is
used-race should be ignored in the absence of particularized findings of discrimination.
Justices Kennedy and Scalia attempted to rewrite history placing Plessy on the same level as
Metro Broadcasting. In a cynical and unprincipled exercise of constitutional decisionmaking,
Justice Kennedy equated the programs at issue in Metro Broadcasting with how the Third Reich
or the South African government had previously defined racial groups. Id. at 633 n.1. Once
again, in this warped view of history, context is completely ignored. Justice Kennedy totally
ignored the brutal history of these infamous regimes, and attempted to equate this savage history
with an FCC program that promoted diversity in broadcasting.
68. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). In Adarand, reiterating her dissent in Metro Broadcasting Justice
O'Connor returned to the theme that all racial classifications-benign or malign-are inherently
suspect. 115 S. Ct. at 2112-18. Thus, benign remedial measures are no different, for the purposes
of constitutional analysis, than invidious discrimination.
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia states that "government can never have a 'compelling
interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination
in the opposite direction." Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). To Justice Scalia,
"we are just one race here. It is American." Id. at 2119. Again, no mention was niade of the
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The historical underpinnings of Justice Harlan's colorblindness
notion further reinforced the proposition that the Constitution embraced
the notion of race, and that government was not free to ignore it.69 Pro-
fessor Fair traces this historical development:70 "In the decade of recon-
struction, between 1865 and 1875, the federal government enacted
legislation and constitutional amendments to end slavery, grant citizen-
ship to former slaves, enfranchise them, and accord former slaves all the
rights and liberties enjoyed by Whites."'" Analyzing the Thirteenth
Amendment, Professor Fair highlights the purpose of the amendment
and Congress' enforcement power under it. Not only did the Thirteenth
Amendment abolish slavery and involuntary servitude,72 it prompted
Congress to enact, under its enforcement power,73 the Freedmen Bureau
Act of 1865." 4 Professor Fair characterizes the Act as "an early form of
affirmative action remedy for former slaves. '75  Thus, the Thirteenth
Amendment and the concomitant enforcement power of Congress
unquestionably recognize race 76 -the Constitution is not colorblind.
Professor Fair further notes that when states continued to perpetu-
ate slavery "in all but its constitutional sense, Congress enacted the Civil
purpose of the Civil War Amendments; centuries of oppression with current effects were glossed
over, and the distinct history of African-Americans was subverted. African-Americans are simply
"Americans" with a shared history with whites. Slavery and all of its present day manifestations
never existed for "Americans," "Americans" need no preferential treatment. Justice Scalia's
facile manipulation of history confused race-type and nation-type, and offered an unsupportable
view of the Constitution.
69. Professor Fair writes: "I do not believe we will attain racial equality until we interpret our
Constitution as proscribing racial caste and placing on government an affirmative duty to eradicate
it." Fair, supra note 10, at 348.
70. For a thorough examination of the history of antidiscrimination law with an emphasis on
the colorblindness principle, see Fair, supra note 11, at 11-44. This Article focuses only on the
Civil War Amendments and their underlying enforcement legislation.
71. Id. at 25 & n.144.
72. See supra note 24.
73. Id.
74. 13 Stat. 507 (1865). Section 2 provided: "That the Secretary of War may direct such
issues of provisions, clothing, and fuel, as he may deem needful for the immediate and temporary
shelter and supply of the destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen and their wives and
children, under such rules and regulations as he may direct."
75. Fair, supra note 11, at 25.
76. But the need for legislative appendages to the Thirteenth Amendment became
almost immediately apparent. Something more than the idealistic words of the
amendment was essential. Widespread atrocities against the free Negroes and their
white friends continued in the South. Most southern legislatures enacted Black
Codes, the many restrictions of which resulted in forcing Negroes to work for their
former masters or other white men. The Negro in effect remained a slave in all but
the constitutional sense. By virtue of these codes, he was "socially an outcast,
industrially a serf, legally a separate and oppressed class."
Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323,
1325 (1952) (quoting JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 163 (1951)).
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Rights Act of 1866 and amended the Freedmen's Bureau Act to
strengthen the power of the national government over civil rights within
each state and territory." 7  The Civil Rights Act of 1866 essentially pro-
vided that former slaves-who were Black-would enjoy the same
rights as whites. 78 Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment, the Freedmen's
Bills, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 all represent attempts to eradicate
caste based on race. More importantly, these legislative initiatives
clearly embraced the constitutional philosophy that race must be taken
into account positively to ameliorate the condition of Blacks.79
The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is equally compelling in
its rejection of colorblindness.8 ° As Professor Fair writes, "Congress
enacted the Fourteenth Amendment because of lingering doubts about
the adequacy of the Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights
Act to secure former slaves their full civil rights."'" "Congressman
[Thadeus] Stevens, introducing the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment in the
House, characterized its basic purpose as the 'amelioration of the condi-
tion of the freedmen."' 82 The Fourteenth Amendment was not intended
to be a clarion call to individual rights, it sought to bring an oppressed
77. Fair, supra note 11, at 25-26 & n.148 (citing 14 Stat. 27 (1866)).
78. These rights included: "[t]he right to make and enforce contracts; [t]he right to buy, sell,
and own realty and personalty; [t]he right to sue, be parties, and give evidence; and [t]he right to
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property." Fair,
supra, note 11, at 26-27. Both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act
contained these enumerated rights. Id.
79. Professor Schnapper states that "[slupporters of the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau bill
stressed the special needs of blacks." Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 767 (1985). The statements of
Senators and Congressmen, who legislated during the 39th Congress on the 1866 Freedmen's
Bureau bill, vividly illustrate that the history of the Civil War Amendments is distinctly race-
conscious. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Fessenden) (noting the economic, social, and political plight of freed slaves); id. at 588 (statement
of Rep. Donnelly) ("We have liberated four million slaves in the South. It is proposed by some
that we stop right here and do nothing more. Such a course would be cruel mockery. These men
are without education, and morally and intellectually degraded by centuries of bondage."); id. at
632 (statement of Rep. Moulton) ("The very object of the bill is to break down the discrimination
between whites and blacks. . . . Therefore I repeat that the true object of the bill is the
amelioration of the condition of the colored people."); id. app. at 75 (statement of Rep. Phelps)
(Congressman Phelps specifically noted the disparities between white and Black political power:
"The very discrimination it makes between 'destitute and suffering' negroes and destitute and
suffering white paupers, proceeds upon the distinction that, in the omitted case, civil rights and
immunities are already sufficiently protected by the possession of political power, the absence of
which in the case provided for necessitates governmental protection.") (emphasis added); see also
Gressman, supra note 76, at 1327 (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment and Freedmen's Bureau
debates of 1866 specifically focused on the status of recently freed slaves).
80. Professor Schnapper notes that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in an era of race-
conscious federal programs. See Schnapper, supra note 80, at 754-84. 4
81. Fair, supra note 11, at 27; see also Gressman, supra note 76, at 1329.
82. Schnapper, supra note 80, at 785 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459
(1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens)). Similar language was employed by Congressman Moulton in
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group into the national citizenry.8 3
Similarly, the Fifteenth Amendment 4 extended the most vital right
of citizenship-the right to vote-to the previously disenfranchised
masses of slaves.8 5 Again, this amendment was not colorblind-it spe-
cifically referenced race and color.
8 6
Finally, Professor Fair chronicles a series of legislative enactments
that emanated from Congress' enforcement powers. Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1870,87 which reenacted the Civil Rights Act of
introducing the Freedmen's Bureau Bill. See Schnapper, supra note 80, at 765 (citing CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866) (statement of Rep. Moulton).
83. Representative Stevens stated:
Whatever law protects the white man shall afford "equal" protection to the black
man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall be afforded to all.
Whatever law allows the white man to testify in court shall allow the man of color
to do the same. These are great advantages over their present codes. Now different
degrees of punishment are inflicted, not on account of the magnitude of the crime,
but according to the color of the skin. Now color disqualifies a man from testifying
in courts, or being tried in the same way as white men .... Unless the Constitution
should restrain them those States will all, I fear, keep up this discrimination, and
crush to death the hated freedmen.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens); see also Fair, supra
note 11, at 27-28.
84. Section 1. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 1.
Section 2. 'The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. It would be ninety-five years before the right to vote became a
practical reality for African-Americans. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
85. Arguing in support of the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, Senator Ross stated:
No class, no race is truly free until it is clothed with political power sufficient to
make it the peer of its kindred class or race and enable it to resist the contingencies
of popular commotion. No nation can be truly republican which denies to any
portion of its citizens equal law and equal rights. By perpetuating this
discrimination between whites and blacks we should remember that we are
sustaining a discrimination established by the enemies of the Union and of popular
government in the interest and for the perpetuation of slavery. [Slavery) will never
die until the negro is placed in a position of political equality from which he can
successfully bid defiance to all future machinations for his enslavement.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 983 (1869) (statement of Sen. Ross).
86. The broad language of the Fifteenth Amendment should not be misconstrued. Certainly,
the language is applicable to all "citizens of the United States," but whites already had the right to
vote. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
Senator Yates described the essence of national citizenship, and argued in support of the
Fifteenth Amendment: "I then asserted the broad and bold proposition that being a citizen,
although he was black, he was entitled to vote just as much as though he were white. The white
citizen was entitled to vote. Nobody denies that. Then, was not the black citizen entitled to
vote?" CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1004 (1869) (statement of Sen. Yates).
87. Fair, supra note 12, at 28 n.159 (citing 16 Stat. 140 (1870), as amended by 16 Stat. 433
(1871)). In legislative debate, Representative Townsend stated:
The [F]ifteenth [A]mendment gave to the colored race the right to vote and to hold
office; but as constitutions are but declarations of rights and duties, and point out the
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1866 and provided for voting rights and criminal sanctions for the depri-
vation of rights under either the 1866 or 1870 Acts.88 Responding to
acts of terrorism against its newly emancipated citizens, Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871.89 "The Core of the Act was sec-
tion 2, which made it illegal to 'conspire together, or go in disguise upon
the public highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose...
of depriving any person or class of person of the equal protection of the
laws. .. ."'90
The last Reconstruction Act was the Civil Rights Act of 187591
which stated, in its Preamble that
it is essential to a just government that.., we recognize the equality
of all men before the law, and hold that it is the duty of government
in all its dealings with people to mete out equal and exact justice to
all, of whatever nativity, race, color, or persuasion, religious or polit-
ical .... 92
The inescapeable conclusion is that Justice Harlan's conception of color-
blindness did not ignore race. Rather, his conception is decidedly color-
conscious because its foundation rests upon the Civil War Amendments
and their underlying statutory framework of congressional enforcement.
As Professor Fair concludes: "The first Reconstruction was not color-
blind. Congress enacted a series of laws designed to ensure that Blacks
would enjoy the same rights as Whites. The Reconstruction Laws
defined national rights in terms of those enjoyed by Whites. 93
Notwithstanding the overwhelming historical evidence against the
means whereby those rights and duties may be secured and enforced, it yet remains
necessary that there should be appropriate legislation to effect the same. The
situation of political affairs at the South since ratification of that amendment, as
manifested in the obstruction to registration of colored voters who are entitled to the
ballot, and the attempts to intimidate them from voting, show conclusively that
some stringent law is necessary to neutralize the deep-rooted prejudice of the white
race there against the negro, and that the only means of the latter to secure his
dearest privileges are to be found in national legislation.
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d. Sess. app. 392 (1870) (statement of Rep. Townsend).
88. See Fair, supra note 11, at 29.
89. This Act is commonly referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act. See Fair, supra note 11, at 29
& n.161 (citing 17 Stat. 13 (1871)).
90. Fair, supra note 11, at 29.
91. Id. at 30. During legislative debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Representative White
articulated the purpose of the Act:
The evil proposed to be remedied by the bill is that people of color in many of the
States are denied the privilege of admission into public schools, of traveling upon
public conveyances, of obtaining food and lodging at public hotels when traveling,
and of going to places of public amusement, theaters, &c.; and to secure to them
equality of right in these respects is the object of this proposed legislation.
CONG. GLOBE, 43rd Cong., 2d Sess. app. 15 (1875) (statement of Rep. White).
92. Fair, supra note 11, at 30.
93. Id. at 31.
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doctrine of colorblindness, proponents of this illusory jurisprudence
attempt to advance two additional myths premised on contorted defini-
tions and mechanistic rhetoric.
2. THE DEFINITIONAL MYTH
Professor Gotanda examines varying theoretical strains of race in
the jurisprudence of colorblindness and concludes that the myth of col-
orblindness is an analytical instrument of subjugation. "A color-blind
interpretation of the Constitution legitimates, and thereby maintains, the
social, economic, and political advantages that whites hold over other
Americans.'"94 Professor Gotanda critiques colorblind jurisprudence,
and develops five themes that emerge from the Court's decisions: (i) the
public-private distinction;95 (ii) nonrecognition of race;96 (iii) racial cat-
egories;97 (iv) formal-race and unconnectedness; 98 and (v) racial social
change. 99
According to Professor Gotanda, race is distinctly defined in four
ways, 100 and the Court employs this definitional approach to race to
94. Gotanda, supra note 16, at 2-3.
95. Here, Professor Gotanda refers to the designation of distinct spheres of permissible and
impermissible conduct. "Race discrimination is unconstitutional only in the realm marked out by
the doctrine of state action." Id. at 5. Racial discrimination is permissible in the private sphere;
the state action doctrine establishes an illusory boundary of prohibited conduct.
96. Analyzing Justice Stewart's dissent in Fullilove, Professor Gotanda identifies the pure
colorblind theme of nonrecognition. It is irrelevant whether the purpose of governmental action is
benign or malign, government should not act on the basis of race. Id. Professor Gotanda suggests
that this view is too simplistic: "Before a private person or a government agent can decide 'not to
consider race,' he must first recognize it." Id. at 6. This glaring tension underlies the Croson
decision. The Court is suspicious of race-it wants to ignore race as much as it can-but it must
recognize the racial composition of the Richmond City Council in order to advance the hollow
argument that "innocent" whites will be injured. See infra pp. 98-111.
97. While race is "objectively fixed," with immutable factors such as skin color and country
of origin, it is also a product of history and social context. Gotanda, supra note 16, at 6. Professor
Gotanda points to the "one drop of blood" stigma as an example of the social construct that
determines status. Id.; see supra note 56.
98. "Under color-blind constitutionalism, references to 'race' mean formal-race. Formal-race
implies that 'Black' and 'white' are mere classification labels, unconnected to social realities."
Gotanda, supra, note 16, at 6. Professor Gotanda postulates that the colorblind model is
acontextual: "[t]he color-blind mode of constitutional analysis often fails to recognize connections
between the race of an individual and the real social conditions underlying a litigation or other
constitutional dispute." Id. at 7.
99. Citing Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting, Professor Gotanda concludes
that, under this thematic model, government must never consider race because it leads to a Nation
divided into racial groups. In order to avoid racial conflict and hostility, race must be ignored.
See Gotanda, supra note 16, at 7. Yet as Professor Gotanda notes, "[I]t is far from clear that a
race-blind society is necessarily a desirable goal." Id. Perhaps African-Americans would truly
"disappear" under this theory of racial social change. See, e.g., RALPH ELLISON, INvIsIBLE MAN
(1947).
100. Interpreting the Court's colorblind jurisprudence, Professor Gotanda places the definition
of race into four distinct categories: (i) status-race; (ii) formal-race; (iii) historical-race; and (iv)
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advance one of the five themes of racial domination. In short, "white
racial domination is supported, protected, or disguised by the particular
theme under discussion."' 0'°
Professor Gotanda's theory of formal-race and unconnectedness is
directly applicable to Croson and Adarand. He argues that the Court's
modem affirmative action jurisprudence is simply a return to the Plessy
notion of formal-race. °2 That is, any consideration of history is sup-
pressed by the Court-race is neutral and the concern shifts to the pro-
tection of "oppressed whites." This is accomplished by two doctrinal
prongs which are cynically employed by the Court: formal-race uncon-
nectedness and the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.
Professor Gotanda explains the effect of the formal-race uncon-
nectedness mode of constitutional analysis: "Formal-race and the appli-
cation of strict scrutiny lend themselves to superficial critiques of
affirmative action programs, thus legitimizing the continued subordina-
tion of the Black community."' 1 3 Under the formal-race unconnected-
ness model, racism is defined as an aberrational defect in what is
otherwise a well-functioning process. Racism is entirely a function of
individual prejudice; it is not systemic.' 04 The historical and societal
aspects of racism are de-emphasized, and race-conscious remedial
approaches must be based on particularized findings of discrimina-
tion. 10 5 This segmentation of the systemic and structural underpinnings
culture-race. "Status-race is the traditional notion of race as an indicator of social status."
Gotunda, supra note 16 at 4. Here, the "distinct, inferior status of Blacks was implicit in the
Constitution," and Congress was powerless to remedy this constitutional mandate of inferiority.
Id. at 37; see also Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Formal-race is the
embodiment of the Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)-"separate but
equal" is premised on the notion that race is neutral. Thus, the fact that Blacks were enslaved in a
separate, inferior caste is not cognizable under the Constitution. See Gotunda, supra note 16, at
38. While formal-race is driven by a blatant disregard of historical and societal factors, historical-
race moves away from this blindness and adopts Justice Harlan's approach in his Plessy dissent.
See id. at 39. Professor Gotanda describes this theme: "Justice Harlan was advocating a peculiar
mix of historical-race and formal-race. Government acts were required to be genuinely neutral;
therefore judicial review of race-based legislation should recognize the historical content of race."
Id.; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text. Professor Gotanda identifies the historical-
race paradigm in Justice Marshall's Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke dissent. Id. at 40
(quoting Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("It [the experience of Blacks in America] is not merely the history of slavery alone
but also that a whole people were marked as inferior by law.")).
Finally, "[c]ulture-race is the basis for the developing concept of cultural diversity."
Gotanda, supra note 16, at 4-5. This is precisely the approach articulated by Justice Brennan in
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 585 (1990).
101. Gotanda, supra note 16, at 3.
102. See supra note 100.
103. Gotanda, supra note 16, at 43.
104. See id.
105. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492, 504-06 (1989).
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of racism limits discussion to a set of "isolated incidents" and severely
undermines race-conscious remedial approaches:
Despite the fact that personal racial prejudices have social origins,
racism is considered an individual and personal trait. Society's
racism is then viewed as merely the collection, or extension, of per-
sonal prejudices. In the extreme, racism could come to be defined as
a mental illness. These extremely individualized views of racism
exclude an understanding that race has institutional or structural
dimensions beyond the formal racial classification. Individual irra-
tionality and mental illness simply do not adequately explain racism
and subordination.
Furthermore, the view that racism is merely an irrational preju-
dice suggests that the types of remedies available to address racial
subordination and oppression are limited.
0 6
Thus, by summarily discounting context and history, formal-race
unconnectedness destroys a governmental entity's ability to address sys-
temic racism,10 7 and the Court invents a mythological world where
racism no longer exists and "everyone" is entitled to an "equal starting
point." 10 8
Strict scrutiny analysis takes on a peculiar meaning when it is
employed as a tool of colorblind jurisprudence. Invoking a theory of
judicial review that "is generally fatal to race-based government
action,"' 0 9 the Court has turned equal protection law on its head. Strict
scrutiny analysis applies not only to invidious discrimination, it now
applies with equal force to race-based remedial approaches designed to
eradicate racial subordination. 0
106. Gotanda, supra note 16, at 44.
107. For example, Professor Gotanda, points to Justice Scalia's concurrence, in Croson, where
he "transforms the contractors into 'the dominant political group, which happens also to be the
dominant racial group."' Id. at 45 n.179 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 524 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)). By ignoring history and context, the Court can characterize the minority contractors
in Richmond as the dominant political power that has trammeled the rights of "innocent whites."
Overruling Metro Broadcasting and implicitly Fullilove, the Court in Adarand, focused on
individual rights and preserved the rights of "innocent whites" whose individual rights had been
undercut by the federal government's race-conscious remedial approach. In Adarand,
congressional power is undermined-the Court refuses to examine the history and context of
racism in federal highway construction projects. See infra notes 155-78 and accompanying text.
108. The "equal starting point" metaphor "implies that if Blacks are underrepresented in a
particular employment situation, it must be a result of market forces. Any statistical correlation is
either coincidental or beyond the control of the employer, and in any case unrelated to the
employer's past practices." Gotanda, supra note 16, at 46; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 16 at
1101 ("It seems likely that the Court is willing to accept, without being willing to state, that
underrepresentation is a function of capability or 'culture.' But even if that were so, why is it an
impermissible state objective to make equality of opportunity a reality by helping blacks to be
more competitive?").
109. Gotanda, supra note 16, at 46.
110. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (1995) ("With Croson, the
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Professor Gotanda articulates two theories of strict scrutiny review:
the Brown v. Board of Education'Il interpretation, which focuses on the
subordination of Blacks and defines race in historical terms;' 1 2 and the
Croson interpretation which focuses on formal-race.' 13  Professor
Gotanda concludes that the historical-race interpretation of Brown is the
correct analytical approach to strict scrutiny review. Since Brown is
based on the Civil War Amendments and their constitutional mandate to'
eradicate discrimination against Blacks, strict scrutiny is correctly
applied to governmental action that is intended to subordinate Blacks as
an oppressed class. Today, the Court has moved away from the Brown
analytical model.
In Adarand, the Court adopted the view that race is inherently sus-
pect, "'14 compelling the conclusion that, "the government's use of any
racial classification triggers strict scrutiny."" 5 This literal reading of the
Constitution obscures the underlying premise of the Civil War Amend-
ments: Caste based on race is constitutionally repugnant and govern-
ment is empowered to make certain that Blacks are no longer subjugated
by a social and legal system of oppression. Professor Gotanda writes:
This version of racial strict scrutiny-that use of any racial clas-
sification is subject to strict scrutiny without reference to historical or
social context-is best interpreted as a use of formal-race. Strict
scrutiny is triggered whether the classification is designed to remedy
the effects of past subordination or designed to further oppress a tra-
ditionally subordinated racial group.
This shift from the use of strict scrutiny to review governmental
oppression of Blacks to review of any use of race has never been
explicitly addressed by the Court; the underlying justification for the
change remains undiscussed." 16
Court finally agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based
action by state and local governments.").
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112. See supra note 101.
113. See supra note 101.
114. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 ("Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must
serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.").
115. Gotanda, supra note 16, at 48; see also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113, 2116-17; Croson,
488 U.S. at 493-94.
116. Gotanda, supra note 16, at 48. The Court, in Adarand, attempted to explain this shift in
Justice O'Connor's three-prong approach-skepticism, consistency, and congruence-to strict
scrutiny analysis. But Justice O'Connor's approach never explains why whites are now
considered an oppressed racial group deserving of the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yet another myth emerges-the myth of white entitlement. See Aleinkoff, supra note 16, at 1098-
99 ("It would clearly be wrong to argue that whites are not harmed by affirmative action
programs. But it would be difficult to construct a plausible case for the proposition that the harms
to whites adversely affected by affirmative action programs outweigh the harms imposed on
innocent black beneficiaries by a history of racism."). Does it necessarily follow that race-
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The definitional myth, with its varying strains of racial labels and
interpretive doctrines, perpetuates caste. It builds upon a historical
approach distorting the meaning of Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent,
ignoring the underlying history of the Civil War Amendments, and
diminishing the significance of the systemic nature of racism. The rhe-
torical myth completes this trilogy of jurisprudential distortion by fram-
ing the affirmative action debate in divisive terms. Affirmative action is
given a "Black face" in the same way as crime was given a "Black face"
by then Vice-President Bush's use of Willie Horton in the 1988 Presi-
dential election.
3. THE RHETORICAL MYTH
Employing an Oedipal metaphor, Professor Morrison illustrates
how blindness-or a conscious effort to ignore race-shapes the affirm-
ative action debate: "There is an uncanny parallel between Oedipus
blinding himself after discovering his guilt and Euro-Americans'
colorblinding themselves after making a similar discovery .... Oedipus
lacked the moral courage to face his guilt as reflected in the sight of his
parents and his people.""' 7 The same lack of moral courage causes the
affirmative action debate to be structured in a manner skewed towards
the perpetuation of caste.
The choice of colorblindness and its underlying doctrinal tenets
"reflects a desire to avoid the painful revelations that may be lurking in
an examination of either racial history or the current racial disparities in
society."' " 8 "[C]olorblindness advances a formal test that strikes down
racial classifications without acknowledging what lead to the need for
such strictures."' 119 Thus, proponents of the colorblind model embrace a
series of convenient distortions. 21 Professor Morrison lists the follow-
ing doctrinal stereotypes:
(1) Affirmative action is not colorblind, because it intentionally
invokes racial classifications;
12 1
conscious remedial approaches will "discriminate"-in the constitutional sense-against whites?
Absent a literal interpretation that ignores history, there is no explanation for this doctrinal shift.
See TRIBE, supra note 11, § 16-22 at 1536-37 (stating that injured whites are not victims of racial
discrimination, and concluding that a focus on the degree of sacrifice visited upon innocent whites
"unnecessarily confounds .. .equal protection analysis."); see also infra notes 318-22 and
accompanying text.
117. Morrison, supra note 16, at 324 (quoting SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS THE KING OF SOPHOCLES I
(David Grene et al. eds., David Grene trans., 1954)).
118. Morrison, supra note 16, at 324.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 314.
121. Id.; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118-19 (1995) (Scalia,
J., concurring). In Adarand, only Justices Scalia and Thomas advocated a pure colorblind
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(2) Affirmative action is not based on individuals, but on groups;122
(3) Affirmative action is not based on merit;' 2 3
(4) Affirmative action leads to racial politics and backlash in the
form of white extremists;
1 24
(5) Affirmative action is exploited by middle-class African-
Americans; 1
25
(6) Affirmative action stigmatizes its intended "beneficiaries;" 
1 26
(7) Affirmative action is social engineering, demanding equal results
rather than equal opportunity;1 27 and
(8) Affirmative action victimizes innocent (white) workers.'
21
Morrison examines each of these distortions and shows how the fallacy
of colorblindness is used to maintain a system premised on white privi-
lege. In its affirmative action decisions, the Court has appropriated each
of these illusory arguments in varying degrees.1 29  All of these argu-
ments are variations on the constitutional metaphor of colorblindness.
Unpacking the myths underlying these propositions, Professor
Morrison offers a critique of the Supreme Court's affirmative action
jurisprudence. The bedrock theme of Professor Morrison's critique is
that constitutional interpretation should not function as an instrument of
subordination, but as one of liberation. The rhetorical myth turns the
constitutional principle of equality on its head, and twists the colorblind-
ness metaphor into a perverse, modem-day mirror image of the infa-
mous "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy. That is, if women and
approach where race is never a factor. See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 520-22 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
122. Morrison, supra note 16, at 314; see also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112 ("[The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not groups.").
123. Morrison, supra note 16, at 314; see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 502 (emphasizing the lack
of any factual finding of how many MBE's were qualified to do work on construction contracts).
124. Morrison, supra note 16 at 314; see also Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603
(1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96.
125. Morrison, supra note 16 at 314; see also Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) ("And, rightly or wrongly, special preference programs often are perceived as
targets for exploitation by opportunists who seek to take advantage of monetary rewards without
advancing the stated policy of inclusion.").
126. Morrison, supra note 16 at 314; see also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (stating that there is no "racial paternalism exception" to the Constitution); Croson,
488 U.S. at 493-94.
127. Morrison, supra note 16 at 314; see also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110; Croson, 488 U.S. at
497 ("[S]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially
classified remedy.").
128. Morrison, supra note 16, at 314; see also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 ("[A]ny person, of
whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution
justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest
judicial scrutiny."); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 ("The Richmond Plan denies certain [white] citizens
the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their
race.").
129. See supra notes 121-28.
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people of color "perceive" themselves as outside of American society
and its societal benefits, it is because they have chosen to adopt that
view. This fairy tale view of American society is wholly without
support.
Paradoxically, a benign remedial effort to eradicate the effects of
discrimination by government is blamed for a deeply rooted system of
racial subordination. Thus, it is affirmative action that is not "color-
blind" because it invokes racial classifications. Yet the purpose of the
governmental action is ignored because racial classifications in and of
themselves are '"evil." By placing the blame on affirmative action, it is
then quite simple to consistently avoid the question of race. Thus, if we
ignore race, racism will go away-we need only avert our eyes and
embrace the rhetorical fairytale. Professor Morrison describes this as a
manifestation of cultural guilt:
The racial guilt implicit in colorblindness rhetoric is evident. The
rhetoric is not quite a guilty plea, however. It is more a plea of con-
fession and avoidance: we confess not the problem, racial subordina-
tion, but the cause, racial classifications .... This rhetoric fails to
address the problem; it simply pronounces a diagnosis and easy cure.
Victory over racism is an accomplished fact. This choice of color-
blindness reflects a desire to avoid facing race in two different ways.
First, it reflects a desire to avoid the painful revelations that may be
lurking in an examination of either racial history or the current racial
disparities in society. Second, colorblindness advances a formal test
that strikes down racial classifications without acknowledging what
lead to the need for such strictures. Euro-Americans thus choose to
blind themselves rather than face their past.'
30
Another strand of doctrinal avoidance is the notion of individual-
ism. Here, affirmative action is not viewed as a device to eradicate sys-
temic oppression, but as antithetical to the notion of individualism; this
leads to a segmented constitutional jurisprudence of individuals, not
groups.1 3' Thus, discrimination must be detected and proven in a piece-
130. Morrison, supra note 16, at 323-24. Professor Morrison also points out that even Justice
Scalia has acknowledged that "[B]lacks have suffered discrimination immeasurably greater than
any directed at other racial groups," see id. at 323 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 527-28) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). However, Justice Scalia then concluded that there is no constitutional right to "even
the score," by using racial classifications. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 527-28. Justice Scalia carried
this proposition one step further in Adarand where he stated that there is only one race-
American. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
131. See supra notes 122-23; see also Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies
the simple command that the Government must treat citizens 'as individuals, not as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class."') (quoting Arizona Governing Comm.
for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083
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meal and particularized manner. Consequently, the analysis is shifted
from principles of anti-subordination and anti-caste to a search for "indi-
viduals" who openly practice racism. By focusing on the protection of
individual rights, race becomes meaningless-individuals are not com-
ponents of racial categories.1 32 Thus, it is not racism that accounts for
systemic inequities, but some "misguided" individual:
Essential individualism demands proof that a particular individual
participated in the discriminatory culture by overtly discriminating.
If evidence of affirmative participation is forthcoming, Euro-Ameri-
cans will offer up the participant as proof of their own innocence
because they were not similarly offered up. Individuality is thus self-
congratulating. Essential individualism enables Euro-Americans to
identify the responsible individual. This understanding of individual-
ity allows the transfer of guilt to another without asking about the
relationship between the "other" and "us." Individuality also allows
Euro-Americans to acknowledge the racial polarization of society
while ironically shifting the blame and guilt from a racist society to
affirmative action programs.
133
Individuality reduces what should be a complex analysis into sim-
plistic notions of societal and cultural blameworthiness. However, the
issue is not guilt-whether Euro-Americans can successfully cleanse
themselves of some societal notion of original sin-it is the eradication
of caste. Inevitably, some members of society, usually those with
entrenched power, will have to carry the burden of sharing that power
with other members of society. This is equality.
134
In order to avoid accepting this burden, opponents of affirmative
action articulate the illusory theory of merit:
(1983)); Croson; 488 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("Rights created by the first
section of the 14th Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights
established are personal rights.") (quoting Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
132. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
133. Morrison, supra note 16, at 328-29.
134. Indeed, what gives the reverse discrimination argument much of its theoretical appeal is
the notion that individual rights have been trammeled. But this argument totally ignores the
nature of injustice premised on race. Professor Dworkin writes:
We are all rightly suspicious of racial classifications. They have been used to deny,
rather than to respect, the right of equality, and we are all conscious of the
consequent injustice. But if we misunderstand the nature of that injustice because
we do not make the simple distinctions that are necessary to understand it, then we
are in danger of more injustice still. It may be that preferential admissions programs
[or other affirmative action measures] will not, in fact, make a more equal society,
because they may not have the effects their advocates believe they will. That
strategic question should be at the center of debate about these programs. But we
must not corrupt the debate by supposing that these programs are unfair even if they
do work. We must take care not to use the Equal Protection Clause to cheat
ourselves of equality.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 239 (1977).
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Perhaps a sense of racial guilt explains this choice of interpreting
merit as an absolute standard .... Absolute standards for merit ease
this guilt. They rhetorically shift the burden of proof in discussions
of racial reparations. Those who want the benefits of society must
prove their worth. Those who are already on top prove their merit
merely by being there .... Furthermore, those who have made it can
presume that those questioning the standards must do so because
they, or someone they care about, is just not good enough.
1 35
Since there is no substantive right to equality in results, merit
explains why some people are inherently underqualified. Proponents of
the colorblind theory view any attempt to remove societal barriers that
perpetuate caste as "racial paternalism." 136 Moreover, they fear that
such paternalism leads to racial politics with decisionmakers who make
assumptions based on race culminating in a backlash of white extrem-
ism. Paradoxically, colorblindness is undercut by reference to race.
That is, in order for proponents of colorblindness to ignore race, they
must first recognize it. Thus, the Court has expressed concern that
Blacks may "take over" the boundaries of legislative decisionmaking
subjugating Whites, and that this will lead to racial strife:
137
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., Justice O'Connor hesitantly
noted that African-Americans were on or just over the verge of
majority status in Richmond, thereby raising the specter of racial
politics. Simultaneously, she avoided holding that racial composition
of the relevant political unit is a legitimate part of equal protection
analysis. The reason for Justice O'Connor's tight-rope act is obvious.
A racial analysis of the political units that adopt laws would have a
dramatic impact on equal protection law. Less obvious is the troub-
ling assumption behind such a vision of racial politics. The percep-
tion is that only minority racial groups engage in racial politics.
Perhaps this belief stems from a sense that Euro-Americans are not a
race. Therefore, Euro-Americans are incapable of racial politics by
definition.'
3 1
Perhaps it is an exaggeration to characterize the Court's reasoning
in Croson, and at least implicitly in Adarand, as judicial paranoia,' 39 but
the racial politics rationale is the modem day equivalent of the racist
notions that surrounded the First Reconstruction: namely, that a gang of
135. Morrison, supra note 16, at 333-34.
136. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
137. See Morrison, supra note 16, at 334-35 ("A pervasive argument against affirmative action
is that it actually creates or exacerbates racial problems. A common version of this argument is
the concern about racial politics.").
138. Id. at 339.
139. Here I refer to the underlying assumption that when people of color gain power they will
inevitably move to subjugate innocent Whites.
[Vol. 51:191
THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION
incompetent, buffoonish Black legislators had "taken over" the Ameri-
can polity. In his seminal work, Black Reconstruction in America 1860-
1880, W.E.B. Du Bois identifies three dominant themes:
1. All Negroes were ignorant.
"All were ignorant of public business."
"Although the Negroes were now free, they were also ignorant
and unfit to govern themselves."
"The Negroes got control of these states. They had been slaves
all their lives, and were so ignorant they did not even know the letters
of the alphabet. Yet they now sat in the state legislatures and made
the laws."'1
40
2. All Negroes were lazy, dishonest and extravagant.
"Those men knew not only nothing about the government, but also
cared for nothing except what they could gain for themselves."'
4'
3. Negroes were responsible for bad government during
Reconstruction.
"In the exhausted states already amply 'punished' by the desolation
of war, the rule of the Negro and his unscrupulous carpetbagger and
scalawag patrons, was an orgy of extravagance, fraud and disgusting
incompetence."
42
It is striking that in order to avoid any consideration of race, it must
first be recognized and then ignored. We are not concerned about race
until "innocent whites" are injured, or if Blacks are shifting the estab-
lished boundaries of the political arena. "The racial politics argument
could violate colorblindness in the same way the term 'innocent whites'
does. For example, the concern only about African-Americans taking
over a specific polity [sic] .... For racial politics even to be possible,
race must be something more than an arbitrary, meaningless group-
ing."'4 3 In essence, colorblindness is held together by a conglomeration
of baseless contradictions which are illuminated with increasing inten-
sity the more we try to ignore race. "[C]olor blindness draws just as
much attention to race as does race-consciousness."
44
For example, the myths that affirmative action is exploited by mid-
dle class African-Americans, that affirmative action has a "stigmatizing"
effect on its intended beneficiaries, and that affirmative action victimizes
innocent white workers, are all examples of how the principle of color-
blindness gives way to a twisted analysis of race. Blacks either "get
140. W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860-1880 711 (1935) (citations
omitted).
141. Id. (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 712.
143. Morrison, supra note 16, at 337.
144. Id. at 338.
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over" on the system,1 45 or they are stigmatized as incompetents,' 46 while
whites are simply the victims of this societal spoils system. 47 All three
myths, however, require an acknowledgement of race-Blacks are bene-
fited and whites are victimized.
Several propositions emerge from the preceding discussion:
1) The Civil War Amendments are based primarily on a notion of
race that sought to guarantee citizenship to African-Americans;
t'14
2) Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent specifically acknowledged racial
caste as a constitutional evil;
49
3) Race is interpreted in strictly formulaic terms so that legislative
initiatives-whether benign or malign-are placed on the same constitu-
tional plane without reference to legislative intent or purpose;1
50
4) Colorblindness leads to a paradoxical and subterranean jurispru-
dence where the central question of race is passively acknowledged only
to be submerged and ignored;'
5 '
5) Stereotypes, such as racial politics, and the stigmatization of
intended beneficiaries, obscure any relevant analysis of race and perpet-
uate caste; 52 and
6) These propositions shape the Court's conception of institutional
power; if race is irrelevant, then both state and federal legislatures must
be circumspect in their efforts to eradicate societal inequities.
153
Thus, it is not surprising that the Court, in Adarand, interpreted
Bolling v. Sharpe so as to limit severely congressional power. Clearly,
this reading does not comport with Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
B. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
Adarand is about much more than affirmative action. It is the first
Supreme Court decision to espouse the New Equal protection. Because
racism no longer exists, or at the very least is impossible to detect, legis-
latures must be restrained by the Court in their efforts to dismantle soci-
etal barriers. Underlying the New Equal Protection is the Court's
145. The recent Glass Ceiling Commission Report belies this proposition. See supra note 45
and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 55-59, 61-93 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 49-68 and accompanying text.
150. Thus, race is inherently suspect and subject to strict scrutiny. See supra notes 94-116.
151. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 136-47.
153. See infra notes 302-51 and accompanying text.
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conception of institutional power. Boiling v. Sharpe is the doctrinal
linchpin of Due Process and the New Equal Protection.
1. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION: BOLLING V. SHARPE
Overruling Metro Broadcasting,15 4 and by implication, Fullilove v.
Klutznick' 5" the Court, in Adarand, refashioned the parameters of insti-
tutional power and diluted the meaning of section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 56 Federal and state power are thus compressed into a uni-
tary standard of judicial review-strict scrutiny. Because the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments are subject to the same equal protection analy-
sis, section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 5 7 now limits federal as well
as state power. This contorted reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
began with the Court's reinterpretation of Boiling v. Sharpe. Ignoring
the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education which prohibited govern-
mental maintenance of caste-based systems of oppression, the Court
instead substituted the illusory notion of colorblindness.
Correctly understood, Bolling v. Sharpe, the federal companion
case to Brown v. Board of Education, stands for a simple proposition: If
it is unconstitutional for states to maintain a caste system in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, then it is
unconstitutional for the federal government to do the same in violation
of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren
clearly articulated this constitutional principle:
We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially seg-
regated public schools. The legal problem in the District of
154. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,
2113 (1995).
155. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Fullilove employed a broad, deferential standard to congressional
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Relying on the notion that Congress was
exercising an "amalgam" of its constitutionally authorized powers, the Court explicitly rejected
the notion that remedial efforts must be colorblind. Id. at 482. This deferential approach has been
criticized as unprincipled and open to an interpretation that would ultimately prove unfavorable to
future remedial efforts. See Drew S. Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 456 (1987). Professor
Days commented:
I continue to be concerned both about the manner in which Congress enacted the
Public Works Employment Act and about the arguments that the Supreme Court
adduced to find the Act constitutional. Specifically, I find myself asking whether
Congress and the Supreme Court, in enacting and approving the Public Works
Employment Act, established standards for the formulation and judicial review of
minority set-aside programs that, constitutionality aside, fall below those we ought
to employ, given our justifiable national sensitivity to racial classifications.
Id. at 456. Professor Days clearly anticipated a decision like Adarand where the loose, deferential
standard annunciated in Fullilove would be obliterated.
156. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
157. See id.
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Columbia is somewhat different, however. The Fifth Amendment,
which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an
equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which
applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and
due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are
not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law,"
and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangea-
ble phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be
so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
158
If states cannot maintain a caste system of public schools because
such an invidious scheme is condemned by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, then certainly the Fifth Amendment due
process clause would require the same of the federal government. While
"equal protection of the laws" and "due process of law" both embrace
bedrock notions of fairness, the Court does not view them as doctrinally
interchangeable. 159 Bolling says nothing about limiting federal power to
eradicate racial discrimination. Instead, Boiling mandates a uniform
constitutional duty for the federal government, under the Fifth Amend-
ment, as Brown did for the states under the Fourteenth Amendment: "In
view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from main-
taining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that
the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government."1
60
Despite the language of Boiling, the Court erected a new model of
interpretation in Adarand. Thus, the Fifth Amendment due process
clause is read to incorporate the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment subjecting federal and state action "to identical
levels of equal protection scrutiny"''6 and ultimately diminishing Con-
gress' enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In so doing, the Court ignored deeply rooted notions of
institutional competence in the name of doctrinal congruity. Noting that
Bolling relied on the well-settled proposition that distinctions based on
ancestry and race were odious and inherently suspect, 162 the Court con-
cluded that Bolling articulated the principle that General Government
could not discriminate on the basis of race.' 63 Thus, the same constitu-
tional duty was imposed on the Federal Government via the Fifth
158. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954).
159. See id. at 498.
160. Id. at 500.
161. Clark, supra note 20, at 1969.
162. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2107 (1995).
163. See id.
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Amendment that was imposed on the state via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.16 The Court then cited several decisions for the proposition that
"the equal protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and the Four-
teenth Amendments [are] indistinguishable .... 6
What is glaringly absent from the Court's analysis is how the
"identical" equal protection components of the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments compel a result that drastically alters the configuration of
state and federal power. The Court has never answered two central
questions: (1) What does the "same" analytical approach to the Four-
teenth and Fifth Amendments mean? and, (2) Has such an analysis ever
contemplated a limitation on congressional power?
The Court's ambivalence is the product of years of doctrinal disar-
ray. Rather than embarking on the arduous task of articulating the scope
of Congress' section 5 powers, the Court has instead settled for the sim-
plistic incantation that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are the
same. One commentator has noted prophetically:
By directing courts to the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
modem reverse incorporation deemphasizes Congress' power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment. In so doing, the doctrine obscures
the fourteenth amendment's allocation of authority. The Reconstruc-
tion Congress thought that states were likely to deny blacks the equal
protection of the laws and viewed the nation's legislature as the most
effective guardian against such denials. Through the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, the Constitution codified a presumption of
congressional competence and state incompetence to treat the races
evenhandedly. By subjecting state and congressional action to identi-
cal standards of review, reverse incorporation contradicts this pre-
sumption. And by emphasizing the penumbras of the fifth
amendment rather than the text of the fourteenth, the doctrine creates
a substantial likelihood that courts will subordinate Congress' express
constitutional powers to a judicially implied restriction .. . . The
result has been the melding of standards of review for state and fed-
eral action, with states granted those powers accorded to Congress,
164. See id.
165. Id. The Court's reliance on these decisions is particularly telling. None of the cited
decisions embrace the Court's conclusion that federal governmental initiatives are subject to
heightened scrutiny when race is employed as a factor. Indeed, the decisions merely stand for the
proposition that the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments are the same without any mention of
why this is so. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) ("[Ihe reach of
the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is coextensive with that of the
Fourteenth .... ); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). None of these decisions reach the ultimate conclusion
of the Court in Adarand that section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment limits federal power under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Boiling was not a case arising under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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and Congress potentially limited by the same restrictions applicable
to the states. Although reverse incorporation thus brings symmetry to
equal protection review of state and congressional action, the doctrine
does so in contravention of the text, history, and structure of the
Constitution. 1
66
Underlying this doctrinal melding is the notion of colorblindness.
Because race is inherently suspect, the same standard that is applied to
states must be applied to Congress; since race is constitutionally irrele-
vant, all remedial efforts-state and federal-must be subject to strict
scrutiny. 67 This approach obscures the plain language of the Constitu-
tion, 68 ignores the legislative intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, 69
and realigns the boundaries of institutional power.
1 70
166. Clark, supra note 20, at 1974-75.
167. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
168. Simply put, it is the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth, that contains the Equal
Protection Clause:
Advocates of reverse incorporation view equal protection restrictions on Congress
as emanating from the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Such a
penumbral restriction cannot, as the Supreme Court has suggested, be "precisely the
same" as the equal protection clause that binds the states since although both the
fifth and fourteenth amendments contain a due process clause, only the latter
contains an equal protection clause. Unless the equal protection clause is a
constitutional redundancy, due process and equal protection must be qualitatively
different.
Clark, supra note 20, at 1975-76 (citations omitted); see also Robert A. Bohrer, Bakke, Weber,
and Fullilove: Benign Discrimination and Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, 56 IND. L.J. 473, 478 (1981); but see Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's
Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541, 554 (1977) (arguing that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments are the same with a few discrete exceptions).
169. Clark, supra note 20, at 1976-78 (chronicling the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and emphasizing that the drafters granted Congress broad remedial powers because
of their distrust of the Supreme Court and the states in enforcing the newly mandated
constitutional rights contained in the Civil War Amendments); see also Bohrer, supra note 168, at
481 ("[Tlhe early congressional history of the fourteenth amendment establishes that from the
outset it was seen as holding out the possibility of an unprecedented role for the federal
government in protecting civil rights and privileges from both states and private infringement.");
see also id. at 492.
170. As one commentator states:
In the section five context, the Supreme Court defines the substantive scope of the
fourteenth amendment; Congress may act only remedially within that scope. The
Court's designation of suspect classes has been a primary mechanism for
establishing the equal protection clause's substantive parameters. Once the Court
has set the parameters, however, the preservation of Congress' enforcement power
requires that Congress have the freedom to exercise discretion within those
boundaries, and have remedial authority at least as broad as that of the judiciary.
The courts still may act remedially in the absence of explicit congressional action,
but once Congress acts, the constitutional allocation of functions requires judicial
deference to Congress' remedial judgment. Reverse incorporation disturbs this
careful balance of power . . . . Since incorporation means that constitutional
provisions originally aimed at the federal government are applied identically against
the states, reverse incorporation would treat congressional and state action as
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If a benign remedial measure is enacted by Congress, it should be
subject to intermediate scrutiny, not scrutiny that is "'strict' in theory,
and fatal in fact."17 1 Essentially, without an invidious purpose, there is
no reason to subject congressional legislation to strict scrutiny analysis.
Justice Brennan's one-way "ratchet,"1 72 that allows Congress to expand
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees,1 73 builds upon this theme.
Thus, under Brennan's rationale, Congress cannot enact legislation that
would perpetuate caste based on race. Yet this does not mean that Con-
gress must ignore race; it simply cannot use race in a manner that is
repugnant to the principle of equality mandated by the Constitution.
Because Congress is bound by the due process dictates of the Fifth
Amendment, its legislation cannot be arbitrary or illegitimate. "Con-
gress can, however, require that specific problems created by the historic
deprivation of equality be redressed by specific, race-conscious pro-
grams of reasonable dimensions related to the effects of past viola-
tions."'174  However, the Adarand Court unnecessarily trampled on this
well-settled principle of institutional competence by restricting govern-
mental decisionmaking and substituting its own narrow view of the
American polity. Clearly, Adarand follows the Court's similar decision
in Croson, decided six years earlier.'
75
Certainly, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not dis-
interchangeable for equal protection review purposes. Therefore, when classifying
by certain suspect criteria, Congress, like states, could pursue only compelling
governmental interests via the least restrictive means. In this way, reverse
incorporation would limit impermissibly the scope of congressional discretion
mandated by the structure of the Constitution and essential to a meaningful
congressional power to enforce the fourteenth amendment.
Clark, supra note 20, at 1979-81.
171. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8
(1972); see also Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and
Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 34 (1983) ("Applying due process concepts in
fifth amendment equal protection cases was quite possibly what the Boiling Court meant all along,
without introducing the levels of scrutiny.").
172. See TRIBE, supra note 12, § 5-14, at 343.
173. See Bohrer, supra note 168, at 489 and accompanying text.
174. Id. at 494.
175. See supra note 166 and accompanying test. For example, "[tihe Court in [Croson] even
went so far as to disallow Richmond's reliance on Congress' finding of discrimination in the
construction industry, the same finding upon which the Court upheld the federal set-aside program
in Fullilove. All such evidence, the Court said, did not show any 'identified discrimination' in the
Richmond area." Eugene Doherty, Equal Protection Under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments: Patterns of Congruence, Divergence and Judicial Deference, 16 Omo N.U. L. REv.
591, 611 (1989). The Court has become the ultimate "fact-finder" as well as the final interpreter
of the Constitution. The Court goes one step further in Adarand, and substitutes its own view of
polity for that of Congress. Clearly, the Court lacks the competence to make such determinations.
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place the authority of the Court to interpret the Constitution; t76 con-
versely, the Court must not alter that section's positive grant of
legislative power:'
77
Furthermore, the identification of the fifth amendment standard with
the fourteenth amendment standard of equal protection is demonstra-
bly incorrect. Thus, Congress is bound neither by the compelling
state interest standard nor by minimum rationality, but rather by an
intermediate standard centered on the due process concept of funda-
mental fairness or, in the words of Chief Justice Burger, to remedial
actions narrowly tailored to combat the present effects of past
discrimination. 
78
2. THE ANTI-SUBJUGATION PRINCIPLE
Further, the Adarand Court's reinterpretation of Bolling is also at
odds with two underlying conceptions of the Fourteenth Amendment-
the anti-subjugation and anti-caste principles.
The anti-subjugation principle is premised on a historical interpre-
tation of the Civil War Amendments:
In Strauder v. West Virginia, the first postbellum racial discrimina-
tion case to reach the Supreme Court, Justice Strong recognized for a
unanimous Court that subjugation was the very evil that the equal
protection clause was meant to remedy: the clause is an "exemption
from legal discriminations implying inferiority," which are "steps
toward reducing [Blacks] to the condition of a subject race."'
179
Boiling embraced the principle that the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and its underlying notion of fundamental fairness, is
an "exemption from legal discriminations implying inferiority."'' 80  If
subjugation was the evil to be remedied by the equal protection clause's
explicit prohibition on the exercise of state power to subordinate Afri-
can-Americans, then the Fifth Amendment applies to forbid subjugation
176. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
177. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
178. Bohrer, supra note 168, at 512; see also Fair, supra note 11, at 80-81 (arguing by analogy
that since the Constitution has never required "genderblindness" and the Court has employed
middle-tier scrutiny in relation to gender, then the same analysis is applicable in race cases); thus,
the salient queries are: (i) under the equal protection clause, are Blacks and whites similarly
situated? (ii) if not, does the legislation (local, state, or federal) serve an important governmental
objective?; and (iii) are the discriminatory means substantially related to the achievement of the
legislative objectives? Because of the legislative mandate inherent in section 5, it could also be
postulated that Congress has an even "freer hand" than states and localities that are constrained by
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is Congress' duty to enforce section 1; whereas the
states have a duty to abide by the constitutional dictates of section 1.
179. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 16-21, at 1516 (concluding as well that the central rationale of
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by the federal government as well. As the Court stated in Bolling, there
are instances where "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be vio-
lative of due process. 1 81 However, this should not be misunderstood as
a limitation on Congress' section 5 power to eradicate conditions that
perpetuate subjugation. There is a marked difference between affirma-
tive action and invidious, state or federally sponsored, oppression.
The Court, in Adarand, attempted to distort this constitutional line.
There, colorblindness shifted the focus from subordination to an acon-
textual interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment where affirmative
action is premised on race and the Constitution forbids any reliance on
race as a factor in legislative decisionmaking. Consequently, a benign
remedial purpose has become constitutionally insignificant. Yet, "[b]oth
the anti-caste and anti-subjugation principles underlying the Equal Pro-
tection Clause explicitly acknowledge the eradication of a dubious hier-
archy premised on [white supremacy]. 182
3. THE ANTI-CASTE PRINCIPLE
The anti-caste principle permits fundamental distinctions to be
made between racist governmental practices and affirmative action.
Affirmative action is not antithetical to our conception of equality; it
embraces equality by attempting to eradicate caste: "The legal claim
might be understood not as an insistence of compensation for past
wrong-doing, but instead on the elimination, in places large and small,
of something in the nature of a caste system."'83 Thus, the Civil War
Amendments were designed specifically to eradicate the American caste
system based on color.184 Race should not be ignored; rather, the ques-
tion is: has race contributed to the maintenance of a caste-like system?
If the answer to this question is "yes," then affirmative action is a per-
missible constitutional means to eradicate caste. This comports with the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Originally the Fourteenth Amendment was understood as an effort to
eliminate racial caste-emphatically not as a ban on distinctions on
the basis of race. A prohibition on racial caste is of course different
from a prohibition on racial distinctions. A ban on racial distinctions
would excise all use of race in decisionmaking. By contrast, a ban on
caste would throw discriminatory effects into question and would
allow affirmative action. In any case the question for the anticaste
principle would be: Does the practice at issue contribute to a system
with castelike features? It would not be: Have the similarly situated
181. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
182. Powell, supra note 30, at 12.
183. CAss R. SUNSTIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 338 (1993).
184. See id. at 339.
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been treated differently? 85
However, in the Court's view, since the answer to the latter ques-
tion will always be "yes," it becomes appropriate to turn the Fourteenth
Amendment upside down and focus on the discriminatory effects visited
upon whites in light of race-conscious remedies.' 86 But this misses the
point completely:
Originally it was also understood that Congress, not the courts,
would be the principal institution for implementing the Fourteenth
Amendment. The basic idea was that Congress would transform the
status of the newly freed slaves, engaging in a wide range of remedial
measures. It was not at all anticipated that federal judges-responsi-
ble for the Dred Scott decision, establishing slavery as a constitu-
tional right-would be enforcing the amendment. Indeed, the notion
that judges would play a major role in helping to bring about equality
under law was entirely foreign to the Civil War amendments.
At some stage in the twentieth century, there was an extremely
dramatic change in the legal culture's understanding of the notion of
constitutional equality under the Constitution. The anticaste principle
was transformed into an antidifferentiation principle. No longer was
the issue elimination of second-class citizenship. Instead, it was the
entirely different question whether those similarly situated had been
treated similarly. This was a fundamental shift. Its occurrence
remains one of the great untold stories of American constitutional
history. 1
87
This fundamental shift transformed the Court from an interpreter of the
Constitution to an architect of political boundaries and severely dimin-
ished Congress' role as the institutional enforcer of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 8 8 Yet, from the perspective of institutional competence,
the Court is ill-equipped to take on the role of political decisionmaker.' 89
185. Id. at 340.
186. Under the anti-caste theory:
[A]ffirmative action does not appear an impermissible taking of any real entitlement
held by whites and men. Because the existing distribution of benefits and burdens
between blacks and whites and between men and women is not natural and
sacrosanct, and because it is in part a product of current laws and practices having
discriminatory effects, it is not so bad if some whites and men are disadvantaged as
a result.
Id. at 343.
187. Id. at 340.
188. See id. at 341 (noting the "institutional insignificance" of Congress).
189. See id. at 343 ('The anticaste principle suggests a norm of equality that cannot be
captured by standard ideas about compensation. If accepted, the principle would also have a
series of consequences for present law. All these consequences are connected with a reading of
the Civil War amendments that is not limited to the capacities of courts."). Professor Sunstein
then suggests that race-conscious remedies are permissible even where there is no identifiable
defendant because the ultimate goal is the elimination of caste. Indeed, there is a clear difference
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In the absence of a clear malfunction of the political system, such
as a state or federally-sponsored system of subordination or caste, the
Court should refrain from imposing its view of "colorblindness" on the
polity. This argument is bolstered when a state is going above the mini-
mal prohibitory floor set in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-
(that no state shall deny equal protection of the laws), and when Con-
gress, under section 5, is enforcing the dictates of equality embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment. 190
C. The Thirteenth Amendment: An Alternate Theory
Building upon the anti-subjugation and anti-caste principles, the
Thirteenth Amendment 9 is a positive grant of legislative power to Con-
gress to eradicate caste: 192
In the words of Senator Trumbull, the principal draftsman of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the civil rights bill, under that amend-
ment "Congress is bound to see that freedom is in fact secured to
every person throughout the land; he must be fully protected in all his
rights of person and property; and any legislation or any public senti-
ment which deprived any human being in the land of those great
rights of liberty will be in defiance of the Constitution; and if the
states and local authorities, by legislation or otherwise, deny those
rights, it is incumbent on us to see that they are secured." '193
The Thirteenth Amendment states that Congress has the power "to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation."' 94 Thus, if there are
present day vestiges of slavery, Congress should have a free hand to
dismantle systemic oppression.195 However, today there is a Second
between race-conscious measures designed to perpetuate caste and those designed to eradicate it.
Id. at 344.
190. I mean to suggest that Congress can, on its own initiative, implement programs designed
to eradicate caste. That is, section 1 is not a limit on Congress' power under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
191. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII, §§ 1-2.
192. "Clearly Congress is empowered under Section 2 but perhaps even states may act to
prohibit badges of servitude. Section 2 is there in order to provide enumerated federal power, but
states don't generally need such enumeration in order to act." Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the
Thirteenth, 10 CoNsT. COMMENTARY 403, 407 (1993).
193. Gressman, supra note 76, at 1327.
194. See supra note 24.
195. This is not a far-fetched notion given the recent findings of the Glass Ceiling
Commission. For example:
1) Black men held only 2.3 percent of the executive, administrative, and managerial
jobs in all private sector industries; they held 3.9 percent of these jobs in the public
and private sectors combined;
2) Black women held 2.2 percent of the executive, administrative, and managerial
jobs in all private sector industries; they held 4.6 percent of these jobs in the public
and private sectors combined;
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Deconstruction,' a jurisprudential counterrevolution against localities,
states, and Congress when these institutions attempt to eradicate the ves-
tiges of discrimination.' 97 This doctrinal shift is contrary to the history
and intent of the Civil War Amendments, and in particular, the Thir-
teenth Amendment.
Essentially, the Court should reaffirm the expansive meaning of
freedom that was adopted in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.'98 There,
after more than one hundred years of dormancy, the Court revived the
Thirteenth Amendment and "held for the first time that a private devel-
oper's refusal to sell a home to an African American family perpetuated
one of slavery's primary badges-the inability to own property."' 99 The
constitutional mandate of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Court's
reasoning in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. lead to the conclusion that
legislative power can, and should, be exercised to eradicate the badges
and incidents of slavery.
Reading section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment together, it becomes readily apparent that
Congress has the power to eradicate racial caste and its incidents as well
as to secure equality. 200 Thus, the emphasis should not be on identifying
particularized findings of discrimination, 20 1 but on eradicating the sys-
temic inequality that is the linchpin of oppression based on racial
caste.20 2 The Court must recognize that societal discrimination is not
amorphous-it is real. There are present day effects that have their
3) Private sector industries that showed the most progress in promoting Black men
to executive, administrative, and managerial positions were: communications (3.7
percent) and business services (3.5 percent);
4) Those industries in which Black men had made the least progress were:
wholesale trade (1.2 percent), other professional services (1.2 percent),
manufacturing (1.6 percent), and construction (1.9 percent);
5) Private sector industries that showed the most progress in hiring and promoting
Black women to executive, administrative, and managerial positions were:
communications (4.9 percent) and insurance (3.0 percent);
6) Those industries in which Black women had made the least progress were:
construction (0.3 percent), wholesale trade (0.3 percent), business services (0.5
percent), and manufacturing (0.9 percent).
THE FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 77-78.
196. I refer to a period of retrenchment, much like that immediately following the First
Reconstruction, following the gains of the Second Reconstruction-the modem civil rights era.
See generally Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 1 (1995) (discussing the legislative history of the Thirteenth Amendment and articulating a
theory of liberation based on section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment).
197. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
198. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
199. Colbert, supra note 196, at 2.
200. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 66.
202. See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
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roots in the past. Unfortunately, the constitutional metaphor of color-
blindness de-emphasizes equality and promotes an ahistorical analysis in
which the primacy of the Civil War Amendments is drastically undercut:
First, the Court focuses on the principle of "color-blindness," rather
than racial equality, as the goal of equal protection. The principle of
color-blindness for some justices has become more important than
achieving racial equality ....
Second, by ignoring this nation's history of racism, the justices
reframe the Reconstruction Amendments' specific purpose of ending
whites' oppression of African Americans into a generalized prohibi-
tion of "race discrimination." This abstracted conception of discrimi-
nation led the justices to oppose affirmative action on the grounds
that it "discriminates" against innocent third parties predominantly
white males who have benefited from this nation's exclusionary
employment policies. Current equal protection interpretation thereby
rejects the historical justification for affirmative action remedies: a
response to centuries of excluding people of color from educational
opportunities and better-paying professional and skilled jobs.2 °3
By viewing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as comple-
mentary constitutional mandates-the former breaking the shackles of
caste and its underlying manifestations and the latter ensuring equality
under the law-it is clear that Congress' power to adopt creative reme-
dial measures to obliterate private and public discrimination is firmly
embedded in the Constitution. Thus, the appropriate analysis in cases
like Croson and Adarand would not be limited to identifying particular-
ized findings of discrimination, but would instead focus, under the Thir-
teenth Amendment, on the historical exclusion of qualified African-
American contractors. 20 4 Thus, such "race-neutral" factors as bonding,
financing, bidding prices, and the ability to repay loans would be viewed
in their proper context 20 5 placing the present day manifestations of caste
in a historical context.
Perhaps most importantly, Thirteenth Amendment analysis pre-
serves the notion of institutional power-Congress is charged not only
with the eradication of slavery, but also must destroy its badges and
incidents as well.206
203. Colbert, supra note 196, at 33-34.
204. If the Thirteenth Amendment guarantees "the freedom to buy whatever a white man can
buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live," see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 443 (1968), certainly this guarantee must include the right to pursue a livelihood free from
the badges and incidents of slavery.
205. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 550 (1988) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting the theoretical allure of race-neutral measures, but concluding that such
measures are basically ineffectual).
206. See Colbert, supra note 196.
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III. ADARAND: CONGRESS As CITY COUNCIL
Adarand marks a sharp departure from the model of institutional
competence previously employed by the Court.2 °7 Following a Fifth
Amendment analysis premised on colorblindness, the Court ignores
history and context in the name of skepticism, 20 8 consistency,20 9 and
congruence. 210 Applying strict-scrutiny to a congressionally-enacted
program, the Court places Congress on the same constitutional plane as
a city council. This equal protection heralds the beginning of the Sec-
ond Deconstruction, a period in which the gains of the Second Recon-
struction are summarily dismantled.
Both Croson and Adarand were wrongly decided because the Court
misconstrued section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation on
both state and federal remedial power. Ironically, the Court's focus was
not on a principled differentiation between section 1 and section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but on how section 1 ultimately limits federal
power. This misconstruction was accomplished by the hollow incanta-
tion that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are the "same." Cer-
tainly, these amendments mean the same thing in prohibiting invidious
discrimination by the federal and state governments, but this should not
mean that states and localities are precluded from voluntarily eradicating
racial caste. Moreover, it should not mean that Congress is limited,
under section 5, to merely imposing its conception of equality on the
states. This approach is "dangerously narrow."21' Congress should be
207. For the first time, the Court applies strict-scrutiny analysis to a congressionally-enacted,
race-conscious remedial program.
208. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995).
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. Discussing Justice O'Connor's Metro Broadcasting dissent, Professor Katz prophetically
observes how, at least implicitly, section 1 significantly narrows Congress' power under section
5-Congress only has unique powers to act with respect to the states. Thus, the states and
Congress are subject to the same standard of review when race-conscious remedies are employed:
O'Connor now claimed ["in an extraordinary reversal of her prior position" in
Croson] that strict scrutiny should be applied to all race-based distinctions, whether
they are imposed by the states or the federal government.
... She distinguished Croson by narrowing it beyond recognition. Her own
opinion in Croson, she maintained, meant only that section 5 gave Congress special
powers to act "respecting the states." This seems to mean that Congress may
impose race-conscious remedies on the state and local sector subject to relaxed
scrutiny [under section 5], but may not impose identical requirements on its own
regulatory agencies without a compelling interest. Congressional oversight of state
action is what is empowered by Section 5, not any generalized power to make real
the ideal of equal protection. This distinction would carve out a narrow area in
which Congress is free to enact wide-ranging race conscious provisions to be
imposed on the states, including many that seriously disadvantaged non-minority
citizens, even though the states could not do exactly the same thing voluntarily, a
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able to adopt, on its own initiative, race-conscious approaches to deeply
rooted systems of oppression.
Section 1 is merely a constitutional edict against state discrimina-
tion, it is not a proscription against a state's voluntary adoption of reme-
dial measures designed to eradicate racial caste. Thus, not only is
section 1 not a prohibition on positive, noninvidious state remedial
efforts, it also does not apply to the federal government. Conversely,
while the federal government is prohibited from discriminating by the
due process and implicit equal protection components of the Fifth
Amendment, it is clear that section 5 neither pre-empts state power to
adopt race-conscious remedies, nor narrows the exercise of federal
power to "state" matters. As Justice Marshall suggested in his Croson
dissent:
With respect, first, to § 5, our precedents have never suggested that
this provision-or, for that matter, its companion federal-empower-
ment provisions in the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments-was
meant to pre-empt or limit state police power to undertake race-con-
scious remedial measures. To the contrary, in Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan, we held that § 5 "is a positive grant of legislative power
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Indeed, we have held that Congress has
this authority even where no constitutional violation has been found
As for § 1, it is too late in the day to assert seriously that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits States-or for that matter, the Fed-
eral Government, to whom the equal protection guarantee has largely
been applied-from enacting race-conscious remedies.212
The Court's most recent approach to the Fourteenth Amendment
blurred the line between section 1, which is an express prohibition of
state discrimination, and section 5 which is an express grant of federal
enforcement power. The result is that Congress, in enacting race-con-
scious remedies, now has little more power than the Richmond City
Council in Croson-both are held to the highest standard of judicial
scrutiny.
dangerously narrow view that fortunately was not adopted by the majority of the
Court.
Lucy Katz, Public Affirmative Action and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Fragmentation of
Theory After Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 317, 318 (1992). Four short years later, the Court, in
Adarand, adopted the "dangerously narrow view" that Professor Katz forbodingly chronicled in
her article. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113, 2117-18; cf. infra note 225 and accompanying text.
212. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 461, 557-58 (1989) (second emphasis
added).
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Justice Stevens took a different approach, instead of drastically
rearranging the boundaries of legislative and judicial power, he
attempted to define the interests that may be legitimately pursued in the
eradication of racial discrimination. While this approach is effective in
preserving some semblance of section 5 power, it is inadequate in
addressing the systemic nature of racism.
Essentially, Justice Stevens adhered to the colorblind approach
while endorsing the primacy of legislative decisionmaking-race is
inherently suspect, but governmental entities are free to adopt remedial
approaches that focus on non-racial, forward-looking factors. Under this
reasoning, only a portion of racial caste is addressed because its history
is ignored. This explains why Justice Stevens could dissent in Fulli-
love,2"3 and then look "forward" in Wygant2l4 ; he then repeated this doc-
trinal approach when he rejected any consideration of past
discrimination as the basis for amelioration in Croson21 5 and later
acknowledged diversity as a legitimate goal in Metro Broadcasting.21 6
A. The Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens: The Institutional
Competence Model
Several themes emerge from Justice Stevens' institutional compe-
tence model:
1) Congress has broad power, but it must act impartially; 217
2) Race is inherently suspect, and should not be used as a proxy for a perverse
form of reparation based upon an overbroad remedy; 21 8
3) While race is not always irrelevant to sound governmental decisionmaking,
it is the judicial system, not the legislative branch, that is best equipped to
identify past wrongdoers and to fashion remedies; 219
4) Diversity and other forward-looking factors are legitimate interests that can
and should be pursued by the government in the eradication of caste;220
5) There is a distinct difference between invidious and benign
213. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511-18 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
216. See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601-02 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
217. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 548 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-14 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
220. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[lit is not necessary to find that the Board of Education has been guilty of racial discrimination
in the past to support the conclusion that it has a legitimate interest in employing more black
teachers in the future"); see also Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601 (1990) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (embracing the concept of future benefit and concluding that broadcast diversity is
a legitimate interest).
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discrimination;2 2 '
6) In institutional terms, there is a marked difference "between Congress' insti-
tutional competence and constitutional authority to overcome historic racial
subjugation and the states' lesser power to do so;" 222 and
7) Congress' section 5 power is not limited, in any way, by section l's express
limitation of state power-"Congress ... can expand the coverage of section 1
by exercising its power under section 5 when it acts to foster equality. 223
Justice Stevens acknowledges the suspect nature of race, but he
does not, for the sake of some hollow notion of consistency 224 or con-
gruence, 225 categorize all race-conscious remedies as constitutionally
invalid. Instead, he adopts a flexible approach that draws distinctions
between discrete spheres of institutional power, invidious and benign
discrimination, and validates legitimate forward-looking remedies. But
as Justice Stevens' doctrinal model is traced from Fullilove to Metro
Broadcasting, it is clear that his notion of institutional competence actu-
ally dilutes legislative power by focusing almost exclusively on future
benefits or forward-looking remedial approaches. Certainly, the for-
ward-looking approach has significant theoretical advantages when
compared to an approach rooted in notions of past sin. 2 6 However, total
allegiance to this approach cuts off a significant portion of the analysis
in affirmative action cases ignoring systemic racism and past discrimina-
tion. In many ways, "past discrimination" is an odd term-it is as if
racism has been completely eliminated and vanished into a distant past.
Instead, racism is deeply-rooted, adaptable, and systemic-"past dis-
crimination" is always replaced with something new that maintains
racial caste. Professor Bell states:
Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even
those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more
than temporary "peaks of progress," short-lived victories that slide
into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white
dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies. We
must acknowledge it, not as a sign of submission, but as an act of
ultimate defiance.227
221. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2120-23 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
222. See id. at 2125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. See id. at 2126 n.1 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
224. See id. at 2111.
225. See id.
226. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases,
100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 98 (1986) ("Trapped in the paradigm of sin, the Court shrinks, even in
upholding affirmative action plans, from declaring that the benefits of building a racially
integrated society for the future can be justification enough.").
227. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 12
(1992).
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Indeed, Croson and Adarand offer strong support for Professor
Bell's conclusion: The Court has decided that it is inappropriate to
apply the Constitution to the immediate plight of Blacks. Affirmative
action has thus reached its logical stopping point. However, while Jus-
tice Stevens' forward-looking approach is limited because it is premised
on a modified view of colorblind constitutionalism, 228 he does recognize
that affirmative action is still a viable tool in the eradication of caste.
1. FULL/LOVE: JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT: AN EXACT FIT
Construing a congressionally-enacted Minority Business Enterprise
("MBE") 229 program, the Fullilove Court, in a plurality opinion authored
by Chief Justice Burger, adopted a deferential 23 ° standard premised on
the notion that Congress was exercising an "amalgam 2 31 of its constitu-
tionally mandated powers. Rejecting colorblind constitutionalism as a
228. Justice Stevens does not embrace the view, shared by Justices Scalia and Thomas, of pure
colorblindness where race is never a factor in legislative decisionmaking.
229. The Public Works Employment Act ("PWEA") of 1977 which amended the Local Public
Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, and authorized an additional $4 billion
appropriation for federal grants to be disbursed by the Secretary of Commerce, through the
Economic Development Administration (EDA), to state and local governmental units for use in
local public works projects. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980). Section 103
(f)(2) of the PWEA defines MBEs and provided, in relevant part:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall be made
under this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives
satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of the amount of
each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises. For purposes of this
paragraph, the term "minority business enterprise" means a business at least 50 per
centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in [the] case of a publicly
owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority
group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence minority group
members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking,
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts.
Public Works Employment Act of 1977 § 103(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6705 (1977). "Although the
statutory MBE provision itself outlines only the bare bones of the federal program, it makes a
number of critical determinations: the decision to initiate a limited racial and ethnic preference;
the specification of a minimum level for minority business participation; the identification of the
minority groups that are to be encompassed by the program; and the provision for an administra-
tive waiver where application of the program is not feasible." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 468. A set of
regulatory guidelines set out the grantee's obligations to seek out qualified, bona fide MBEs; to
provide training and technical assistance; and to assist MBEs in negotiating the intricacies of the
contract bidding process. See id. at 468-69. The guidelines also provide for either a total or
partial administrative waiver of the 10% MBE requirement and a complaint procedure. See id. at
469.
230. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472 (stating that Congress is a "co-equal" branch which should be
accorded deference in legislative decisionmaking).
231. Id. at 473-79 (noting that the PWEA of 1977 is "primarily an exercise of the Spending
Power;" that Congress could have regulated the practices of prime contractors on federally funded
public works projects by utilizing the Commerce Power; and that "as the MBE program pertains
to the actions of state and local grantees, Congress could have achieved its objectives by use of its
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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limit on Congress' remedial powers,23 2 the plurality concluded that the
MBE program was neither underinclusive2 33 nor overinclusive 23 4-Con-
gress acted well within its constitutionally enumerated powers. Signifi-
cantly, the Court explicitly articulated a conception of institutional
competence that embraced the primacy of Congress as the national
legislature:
With respect to the MBE provision, Congress had abundant evidence
from which it could conclude that minority businesses have been
denied effective participation in public contracting opportunities by
procurement practices that perpetuated the effects of prior discrimina-
tion. Congress, of course, may legislate without compiling the kind
of "record" appropriate with respect to judicial or administrative pro-
ceedings. Congress had before it, among other data, evidence of a
long history of marked disparity in the percentage of public contracts
awarded to minority business enterprises. This disparity was consid-
ered to result not from any lack of capable and qualified minority
businesses, but from the existence and maintenance of barriers to
competitive access which had their roots in racial and ethnic discrimi-
nation, and which continue today, even absent any intentional dis-
crimination or other unlawful conduct.235
In Fullilove, the Court explicitly acknowledged the systemic nature
of racism-it is not only driven by an invidious intent but also by linger-
ing discriminatory effects. At least with respect to congressional reme-
dial efforts, the Court rejected colorblindness. By contrast, Justice
Stevens embraced the notion of colorblindness and this ultimately
shaped his conception of institutional power.23 6 He concluded that
232. Id. at 482. The Court even states that "[it is not a constitutional defect in this program
that it may disappoint the expectations of nonminority firms." Id. at 484.
233. There has been no showing in this case that Congress has inadvertently effected an
invidious discrimination by excluding from coverage an identifiable minority group
that has been the victim of a degree of disadvantage and discrimination equal to or
greater than that suffered by the groups encompassed by the MBE program.
Id. at 486.
234. The overinclusiveness challenge is essentially that businesses receive a windfall solely
because of race or ethnicity "which cannot be justified on the basis of competitive criteria or as a
remedy for the present effects of identified prior discrimination." Id. at 486. Noting that the
administrative scheme provides for waiver and exemption, the Court rejected this contention:
"That the use of racial and ethnic criteria is premised on assumptions rebuttable in the
administrative process gives reasonable assurance that application of the MBE program will be
limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives contemplated by Congress and that
misapplications of the racial and ethnic criteria can be remedied." Id. at 489.
235. Id. at 477-78.
236. Justice Stevens even went so far as to suggest that "[i]f the National Government is to
make a serious effort to define racial classes by criteria that can be administered objectively, it
must study precedents such as the First Regulation to the [Nazi Germany] Reichs Citizenship Law
of November 14, 1935." Id. at 534 n.5. This cynical suggestion seems to conflict directly with
Justice Stevens' later assertion, in Adarand, that there is no moral equivalence between invidious
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"[t]he 10% set-aside contained in the Public Works Employment Act of
1977... creates monopoly privileges in a $400 million market for a class
of investors defined solely by racial characteristics.
2 37
Rejecting the plurality's deferential approach, Justice Stevens
advanced several criticisms: i) the 10% set-aside is nothing more than a
perverse form of reparation;2 38 ii) the 10% set-aside is too broad to right
any past wrong; 239 iii) the spectre of racial politics renders this congres-
sional enactment constitutionally invalid;240 and iv) while greater minor-
ity participation in a competitive economic marketplace is
"unquestionably legitimate," the statute is not designed to remove any
barriers to entry.24'
As to (i), Justice Stevens noted that while there may be groups,
such as Blacks, who are entitled to "special reparations," 242 the PWEA
was so broadly drafted that it included other groups who have no special
claim to entitlement: "Quite obviously, the history of discrimination
against black citizens in America cannot justify a grant of privileges to
Eskimos or Indians. 243 To Justice Stevens, the racial classifications in
Fullilove are nothing more than a proxy for special privileges based
upon a random and inequitable formula.244 While historical discrimina-
tion cannot be ignored, "[i]t does not necessarily follow that each of
those subclasses suffered harm of identical magnitude. 245
Under (ii), Justice Stevens relied on "the scarcity of litigated claims
on behalf of [MBEs] during this period."246 to justify his conclusion that
"the law has generally been obeyed. 2 47 Employing this rather optimis-
tic approach, Justice Stevens then concluded that the statutory remedy
was "much broader than is necessary to right any such past wrong.
248
and noninvidious governmental conduct. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120-23 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
237. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
238. See id. at 536-38.
239. See id. at 539-40.
240. See id. at 541-42.
241. See id. at 542-48.
242. See id. at 537.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 538-39.
245. Id. at 538.
246. Id. at 540.
247. Id.
248. Id. Justice Stevens sets out five preferential classes:
1) those minority-owned firms that have successfully obtained business in the past
on a free competitive basis and undoubtedly are capable of doing so in the future as
well; 2) firms that have never attempted to obtain any public business in the past; 3)
firms that were initially formed after the Act was passed, including those that may
have been organized simply to take advantage of its provisions; 4) firms that have
tried to obtain public business but were unsuccessful for reasons that are unrelated
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Perhaps the most striking feature of Justice Stevens' Fullilove dis-
sent was his invocation of the racial politics rationale.24 9 He disparaged
the Congressional Black Caucus for wanting "a piece of the action" of
the Federal Government's $4 billion public contract business. 250  He
then concluded that "[t]he legislators' interest in providing their constit-
uents with favored access to benefits distributed by the Federal Govern-
ment is, in my opinion, a plainly impermissible justification for this
racial classification."25' Justice Stevens expressed concern that this type
of statutory preference may amount to nothing more than political
patronage by the party in power which is particularly distressing when
benefits are distributed on the basis of race.
252
Finally as to (iv), Justice Stevens found that the statute was not
designed to remove any barriers to entry.253 Thus, even though greater
minority participation in the federal public contracting market is a legiti-
mate interest, the legislative history of the statute does not detail any
barriers to minority participation. He viewed systemic factors such as
unfamiliarity with the bidding process and difficulties in obtaining
financing as purely neutral, nonracial factors that were functions of the
marketplace.254 He took this notion one step further when he concluded
that prejudice is less likely in the public sector-because of state and
federal laws prohibiting discrimination-than in the private sector.255
According to Justice Stevens, race classifications enacted by the
federal government, particularly where such classifications were "unnec-
essary," were subject to the same scrutiny applied to state initiatives:
"Whenever Congress creates a classification that would be subject to
to the racial characteristics of their stockholders; and 5) those firms that have been
victimized by racial discrimination.
Id. at 540-41. He concluded that the firms listed in 1-4 have not been wrongfully excluded from
the marketplace, so there is no need for a statutory preference for these firms. Id. at 541. Since
there was a judicial remedy available for those firms in the fifth category, then it is "inappropriate
to regard the preference as a remedy designed to redress any specific wrongs." Id.
This analysis turns the PWEA on its head-Justice Stevens ignored the waiver and adminis-
trative exemption provisions, see supra note 229, in order to conclude that the statute is too broad.
In other words, categories 1-4 would probably be excluded under the PWEA, and the fifth cate-
gory is squarely within the ambit of the statute. Justice Stevens disregarded the legislative find-
ings of Congress. Ironically, in Adarand, he took a deferential view of the very same institutional
power.
249. This view is the linchpin of Justice O'Connor's analysis in Croson, and to a certain
extent, in Adarand. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 495; Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
250. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 542.
251. Id.
252. See id,
253. See id. at 543.
254. See id. at 543-44.
255. See id. at 544-45. Justice Stevens also noted that racial preferences foster resentment.
See id. at 545.
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strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment if it had been fashioned by a state legislature, it seems to
me that judicial review should include a consideration of the procedural
character of the decisionmaking process. '"256
In Fullilove, Justice Stevens embraced a theory of institutional
competence that limited congressional power under section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment refusing to "look forward" or to accord any def-
erence to legislative decisionmaking. Thus, he obliterated the line
between state and federal power that he would later redraw in Adarand.
A number of doctrinal shortcomings are present in Justice Stevens'
Fullilove model: 1) By ignoring the systemic inequality that contributes
to racial caste-the structural aspects of the federal public contracting
marketplace are obscured;257 2) although the PWEA was concededly not
drafted in the most artful way, this approach illustrates that the Court is
not competent to make these types of legislative choices-the focus
should be on discrimination, not definitional categories;2 58 3) particu-
larly where there is no evidence of an invidious purpose, invalidation
should not be automatic simply because a statute employs racial classifi-
cations; 259 4) the historic anti-caste principle embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment is ignored thereby diluting congressional power; 260 and 5)
the racial politics rationale may perpetuate the very stereotypes that Jus-
tice Stevens rejected under his Fullilove model.26'
Further, Justice Stevens' dissent in Fullilove offered a very narrow
256. Id. at 550-51.
257. For example, Justice Stevens does not address the stark disparities in the public
contracting marketplace.
While minority persons comprise about 16 percent of the Nation's population, of the
13 million businesses in the United States, only 382,000, or approximately 3.0
percent, are owned by minority individuals. The most recent data from the
Department of Commerce also indicates that the gross receipts of all businesses in
this country totals about $2,540.8 billion, and of this amount only $16.6 billion, or
about 0.65 percent was realized by minority business concerns.
Id. at 465 (plurality opinion). These disparities may be directly attributable to systemic factors
such as bonding, financing, and accessibility to the marketplace. As the Glass Ceiling Report
illustrates not much has changed during the sixteen years since Fullilove. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 155, 249, and 255 and accompanying text.
259. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 518 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[p]rinciples outlawing the
irrelevant or pernicious use of race were inapposite to racial classifications that provide benefits to
minorities for the purpose of remedying the present effects of past racial discrimination.").
Paradoxically, Justice Stevens later criticized the Adarand majority for placing invidious and
noninvidious conduct in the same category.
260. See id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I conclude, therefore, that the Enforcement
Clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Congress the authority to
select reasonable remedies to advance the compelling state interest in repairing the effects of
discrimination.").
261. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
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conception of institutional power, he later repeats this view in Croson
thereby placing Congress and the states on the same constitutional plane.
However, he abandons this narrow view of Congressional power in
Wygant and Metro Broadcasting. Wygant and Metro Broadcasting rep-
resent Justice Stevens' forward-looking approach to racially conscious
remedial efforts. But the central tension remains: Why is Justice Ste-
vens able to "look-forward" in Wygant and Metro Broadcasting after
refusing to do so in Fullilove and Croson?
It seems that the answer to this query lies in Justice Stevens' will-
ingness to endorse remedial approaches that offer some future benefit.
Fullilove and Croson fall on the opposite side of Justice Stevens' doctri-
nal line because the remedial approaches in these cases sought to eradi-
cate some aspect of past discrimination based on race. Under Justice
Stevens' forward-looking approach, racial preferences should not be
used to correct past injustices but to attain the aspirational goal of color-
blindness. Thus, it is easier to justify decisions like Wygant (where
Black public school teachers are role models for the future benefit of
Black students) and Metro Broadcasting (where broadcast diversity is a
legitimate goal, not a remedy for past discrimination against Black
broadcast entrepreneurs). Yet, Justice Stevens fails to acknowledge that
any future benefits are directly related to the eradication of the present
effects of past discrimination.
2. WYGA NT: FORWARD-LOOKING APPROACH
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,26 2 the Court analyzed a
race-based layoff system agreed upon in the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the Jackson, Michigan Board of Education and the Jack-
son Education Association (teacher's union), the Court concluded that
such a system is constitutionally invalid:
No one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in this
country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies
that work against innocent people, societal discrimination is insuffi-
cient and overexpansive. In the absence of particularized findings, a
court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the
past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future.
263
The plan in Wygant would displace nonminority teachers with
greater seniority "in order to retain minority teachers with less senior-
ity.''261 Rejecting the theory that racial preferences are a constitutionally
permissible means to eradicate societal discrimination because they help
262. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
263. Id. at 276.
264. Id. at 282.
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retain minority teachers and provide "role models" for minority school
children, the Court stated that societal discrimination is too amorphous
to remedy 265 and that the layoff plan was not "sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored. 266 The Court suggested that hiring goals were much less intru-
sive than layoffs which would unduly burden innocent nonminority
teachers.267
There is something doctrinally perverse about the Court's reasoning
in Wygant when it is placed alongside Washington v. Davis.268 The
Court has consistently refused to look at the state of the victim's exist-
ence-subjugation-or systems of caste. Professor Tribe writes:
In Washington v. Davis the Supreme Court feared that adoption of a
disparate impact test for equal protection analysis would threaten a
whole panoply of socioeconomic and fiscal measures that inevitably
burden the average poor black more than the average affluent white.
That might be a concern if all resource allocations that had a statisti-
cally differential impact by race were automatically subject to strict
scrutiny....
The antisubjugation principle does not argue for adopting dispa-
rate impact as a per se rule; strict judicial scrutiny would be reserved
for those government acts that, given their history, context, source,
and effect, seem most likely not only to perpetuate subordination but
also to reflect a tradition of hostility toward an historically subjugated
group, or a pattern of blindness or indifference to the interests of that
group.
2 6 9
Yet, the Court refused to make this basic differentiation between
governmental action that maintains subjugation and non-invidious action
that is designed to eradicate the present effects of historical subordina-
tion. 270 Thus, where the disparate impact is on innocent whites, the
Court is willing to assume that there is some underlying discriminatory
purpose.27 "On the one hand, the Court bends over backwards not to
impose penalties for intentional discrimination, by presuming the inten-
tional discrimination is not present unless the evidence establishes other-
wise. On the other hand, the Court presumes invidious intentional
discrimination when examining benign discrimination policies. '"272 This
is a revealing departure from the Court's treatment of disparate impact
265. See id. at 276.
266. Id. at 283.
267. See id. at 283-84.
268. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
269. TRIBE, supra note 111, § 16-21, at 1519-20.
270. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
272. Mark Strasser, The Invidiousness of Invidiousness: On the Supreme Court's Affirmative
Action Jurisprudence, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 323, 402-03 (1994).
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when the burden is on African-Americans: then, there must be a show-
ing of discriminatory purpose.273
Discussing this doctrinal incongruity, Professor Chang observes:
[U]nder Davis, the harm that this individual black jobholder would
have suffered from a traditional last-hired, first-hired principle is con-
stitutionally irrelevant. Under Wygant, the harm that the white
jobholder did suffer from a nontraditional policy of compensating for
effects of past racial discrimination provides a basis for
invalidation.274
If the Court is going to require discriminatory purpose where disparate
impact is established, then it must do so consistently. In the absence of
racial animus or discriminatory purpose, then the "impact" on whites in
cases like Wygant, Croson and Adarand must be-as it was in Davis
when the impact was on Blacks-constitutionally irrelevant. 275 "[T]he
Court's inconsistent treatment of harmful impact in Davis and Wygant
also drives Croson's restrictive definition of when a purpose to redress
the effects of past racial discrimination is permissible. 276 There must
be a distinction made between the varying strains of disparate impact
and how they affect Blacks and whites differently: There is a marked
difference between the burdens that are a product of subordination and
those that are the product of our pursuit of equality. It is not enough to
say that discriminatory impact should be constitutionally irrelevant,
when determining remediable forms of racial discrimination, impact
must be analyzed as a product of subordination and caste.277
Justice Stevens managed to avoid the Wygant plurality's inconsis-
tent approach in instances of non-invidious governmental conduct. "In
Wygant, Justice Stevens would have upheld a collective bargaining
agreement to maintain the prevailing percentage of minority teachers
.... He found a valid purpose behind the agreement, not in redress for
'sins that were committed in the past,' but rather in the value of 'educat-
ing children for the future.'" 278 Because compensation for past discrimi-
nation is irrelevant under Justice Stevens' forward-looking paradigm, it
cannot be suggested that innocent whites are being penalized for condi-
tions that they did not create. Thus, African-Americans are not receiv-
ing compensation for past discrimination that is difficult to define in
273. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
274. David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial
Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 790, 799 (1991) (emphasis added).
275. See id. at 805-09, 817.
276. Id. at 821.
277. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 183, at 345.
278. Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1146, 1156-57
(1987).
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terms of oppressed and "oppressor." The Black school teachers in
Wygant were not being compensated for the lingering effects of past
discrimination; instead, the school children were receiving a future bene-
fit-a quality education.
Justice Stevens rejected the notion that the agreement at issue in
Wygant would unfairly burden others, who were not responsible for past
discrimination, to attain equality. This is a noticeable departure from his
position in Fullilove where he was quite concerned with the plight of
innocent victims, particularly in light of what he viewed as a broad con-
gressional remedy.279 Obviously, there would be a burden placed on
whites; however, Justice Stevens defined this burden as a future benefit
defined in the public interest:
[I]t is not necessary to find that the Board of Education has been
guilty of racial discrimination in the past to support the conclusion
that it has a legitimate interest in employing more black teachers in
the future. Rather than analyzing a case of this kind by asking
whether minority teachers have some sort of special entitlement to
jobs as a remedy for sins that were committed in the past, I believe
that we should first ask whether the Board's actions advances the
public interest in educating children for the future. If so, I believe we
should consider whether that public interest, and the manner in which
it is pursued, justifies any adverse effects on the disadvantaged
group. 280
Further, Justice Stevens posed three basic questions: "What class is
harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a 'tradition of
disfavor' by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being served
by the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that
justifies the disparate treatment?"28
Concluding that "race is not always irrelevant to sound governmen-
tal decisionmaking, '' 212 Justice Stevens reasoned that, in the context of
public education, there are distinct benefits in retaining minority teach-
ers: "It is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white teacher that
color, like beauty, is only 'skin deep'; it is far more convincing to expe-
rience that truth on a day-to-day basis during the routine, ongoing learn-
ing process. ' '283 Thus, there was an "unquestionably legitimate basis" '284
for the Board's decision even though it disadvantaged some white
school teachers.
279. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 538-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
280. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 313 n.l.
282. Id. at 314.
283. Id. at 315.
284. Id. at 315-16.
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Second, the public purpose was one of inclusion-the race-con-
scious plan of Wygant was quite different from an invidious plan of
exclusion. Justice Stevens declared, "[c]onsideration of whether the
consciousness of race is exclusionary or inclusionary plainly distin-
guishes the Board's valid purpose in this case from a race-conscious
decision that would reinforce assumptions of inequality. 285 Signifi-
cantly, the fact that whites were not, and never had been, a "traditionally
disfavored group" drove this analysis-inclusion does not reinforce
racist notions of inferiority. The fact that some whites would be dis-
placed by this race-specific retention policy did not contribute to
assumptions of inequality. In essence, equality means that the majority
must share some burden so that the minority can participate freely in
society.
Finally, in assessing the harm to the disadvantaged teacher, Justice
Stevens found that the race-conscious policy was adopted in a fair pro-
cedural framework "with [the] full participation of the disadvantaged
individuals," and with a narrowly circumscribed berth for the policy's
operation. 286 Moreover, there were non-racial factors, such as economic
conditions, that contributed to the layoffs. 287 Thus, the decision to
include more minority teachers "transcends the harm" 288 to the white
school teachers.
Again, there are limitations in Justice Stevens' forward-looking
approach. His notion of inclusion as a normative equal protection prin-
ciple is only partially inclusive-he presents a fragmented view of racial
discrimination that ignored the minority school teacher's plight and
overemphasized the "future benefit" to the minority students. Thus, he
had great difficulty in reconciling his notion of inclusion in Wygant with
Fullilove:
Justice Stevens' views on affirmative action have developed over
time. His earlier opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, cannot be recon-
ciled with the view he expressed in Wygant, despite his apparent
intent that the two opinions be seen as consistent. Although he
applied the rhetoric of his equal protection inquiry in Fullilove, his
examination there did not reflect a concern with inclusion as a norm
of equality. The only conceivable bases he could imagine for differ-
entiation based on race were that the members of the preferred class
had been victims of unfair treatment in the past or that they would be
less able than others to compete in the future.289
285. Id. at 316-17.
286. Id. at 318.
287. See id. at 318-19.
288. Id. at 320.
289. See supra note 278, at 1157 n.59 (citations omitted).
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But there is something more at work in Justice Stevens' variant
Fullilove and Wygant institutional competence models-race. In the
ultimate paradox, Justice Stevens had to recognize race in order to move
towards colorblindness: in Fullilove, he was disturbed that members of
the Congressional Black Caucus "want a piece of the action," 290 and in
Wygant, he was relieved that the disadvantaged class, white school
teachers, fully participated in the collective bargaining agreement that
would ultimately displace them. 291 Thus, his willingness to accept some
form of race-conscious remedy hinges on his conception of how race
structures polity. It is inevitable that the forward-looking approach will
be selective in its reach; thus, Fullilove and Croson did not fit in this
forward-looking conception because both involve some aspect of "racial
politics. '292 Conversely, Wygant, Metro Broadcasting, and Adarand, all
fit nicely into Justice Stevens' conception of institutional competence
because he can argue that diversity or, to a lesser degree, economic com-
petitiveness justified the use of race-conscious remedial approaches
rooted in the future.293
Yet, he has never articulated how the normative principle of inclu-
sion is distinguishable in cases like Fullilove and Croson and fully oper-
ative in cases like Wygant, Metro Broadcasting, and Adarand. Again
the paradox emerges-Justice Stevens must walk a doctrinal tightrope.
Analytically, his approach in dissent in Fullilove mirrors his concurrence
in Croson; thus, when he attempted to preserve Congress' section 5
power in Adarand he was forced to distinguish Fullilove294 and
Croson.295
290. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 286-88 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 516 n.9 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting the possibility that the
predominately Black Richmond City Council engaged in racial patronage).
293. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2128-31, (1995) (noting
forward-looking components of the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance
Act (STURAA) and concluding that "[t]his program, then, if in part a remedy for past
discrimination, is most importantly a forward-looking response to practical problems faced by
minority subcontractors"); Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (diversity is "unquestionably legitimate"); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
294. To distinguish Fullilove, Justice Stevens focused on the forward-looking components of
the STURAA as compared to the race-specific PWEA in Fullilove. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2128-
31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
295. To distinguish Croson, Justice Stevens has to reconstruct the line between federal and
state power that he previously had attempted to erase in Fullilove. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2123-26
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting the notion of congruence and stating that Congress should be
accorded greater deference than states or municipalities).
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3. CROSON: JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE: REJECTION OF
BACKWARD-LOOKING APPROACH
Croson is a particularly devastating opinion because the Court, for
the first time, adopted a strict scrutiny standard that narrowly constrains
governmental power. In many ways, Croson is the mirror image of Ful-
lilove, but the Court here began the doctrinal course that inevitably led
to Adarand-colorblind constitutionlism displaced constitutional analy-
sis of caste. In a 6-3 opinion, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court,
invalidated the City of Richmond's Minority Business Enterprise (MBE)
program.296 Specifically, Justice O'Connor rejected the five factual
predicates underlying the City of Richmond's MBE program: (i) the
ordinance was remedial in nature;297 (ii) there was ample evidence of
past discrimination in the construction industry;29 (iii) minority busi-
nesses received 0.67% of prime contracts from the city while minorities
constituted 50% of the city's population; 299 (iv) there were only a small
number of minority contractors in local and state contractors' associa-
tions;3"' and (v) in 1977, Congress had made a determination that the
effects of past discrimination stifled MBEs nationally.30'
Justice O'Connor found that "[n]one of these 'findings,' singly or
together, provided the city of Richmond with 'a strong basis in evidence
for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary. ' '302 Thus, absent
particularized findings of discrimination-namely, some form of de jure
discrimination by the city of Richmond itself-there could be no reme-
dial efforts to cure amorphous, "societal discrimination.
30 3
296. The City program was patterned after the MBE program upheld in Fullilove:
The Plan required prime contractors to whom the city awarded construction
contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of the contract to one or
more [MBE's] ....
The 30% set-aside did not apply to city contracts awarded to minority-owned
prime contractors.
The plan defined an MBE as "[a] business at least fifty-one (51) percent of
which is owned and controlled ... by minority group members." "Minority group
members" were defined as "[c]itizens of the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts."
Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78 (citations omitted). There was a provision for partial or complete
waiver of the 30% set-aside, id. at 478-79; there was no direct administrative appeal from a denial
of a waiver request, id. at 479; however, there was a general right of protest where a bidder was
denied an award for failure to comply with the MBE requirements. Id.





302. Id. at 500 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality
opinion)).
303. See id. at 497.
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Considering factual predicate (i), Justice O'Connor stated that "the
mere recitation of a 'benign' or legitimate purpose for a racial classifica-
tion is entitled to little or no weight. ' '301 Specifically, if a race-conscious
remedy negatively impacts innocent third parties, like Croson, then leg-
islative "labelling" will not pass constitutional muster.3 °5 Again, no dis-
tinction between invidious and non-invidious discrimination was
recognized.
In her analysis of factual predicate (ii), Justice O'Connor built upon
her analysis of the first factual predicate and ignored the City of Rich-
mond's legislative fact finding that there was racial discrimination in the
construction industry locally, statewide, and nationally:
[W]hen a legislative body chooses to employ a suspect classification,
it cannot rest upon a generalized assertion as to the classification's
relevance to its goals .... The history of racial classifications in this
country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or execu-
tive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection
analysis.3°6
Moving to factual predicate (iii), Justice O'Connor concluded that
the minuscule percentage of MBE contracts awarded to minorities was
statistically insignificant because there was no evidence of how many
qualified MBEs there were to undertake the prime contracts.30 7 More-
over, because the record was "silent" as to the enforcement history of
Richmond's anti-discrimination statutes, the 30% set-aside was based
"on the unsupported assumption that white prime contractors simply will
not hire minority firms. 30 8
Reviewing factual predicate (iv), Justice O'Connor stated that low
MBE membership in local contractors' associations, standing alone, "is
not probative of any discrimination in the local construction indus-
try.",309 Because there was no linkage made between those MBEs eligi-
ble for membership in the associations and the low minority
membership, these low numbers were deemed irrelevant 3 10-perhaps,
Blacks simply had other career interests or opportunities.
304. Id. at 500.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 500-01 (citations omitted); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235-
40 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). It is chillingly ironic that in order to support her rejection of
the legislative record in Croson, Justice O'Connor has to rely on Korematsu, the infamous
Japanese internment case which is the only instance where an invidious governmental initiative
has passed strict scrutiny. See infra note 390 and accompanying text.
307. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 501-03, 502 n.3. This is nothing more than an artful use of the
rhetorical myths discussed previously. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
308. Croson, 488 U.S. at 502.
309. Id. at 503.
310. See id.
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To discard the final factual predicate, (v), Justice O'Connor drew
upon the clearly defined boundaries of institutional power that she
would later reject in Adarand:
[T]he city... relied on Congress' finding in connection with the set-
aside approved in Fullilove that there had been nationwide discrimi-
nation in the construction industry. The probative value of these
findings for demonstrating the existence of discrimination in Rich-
mond is extremely limited.
... Congress was exercising its power under § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment in making a finding that past discrimination
would cause federal funds to be distributed in a manner which rein-
forced prior patterns of discrimination. While the States and their
subdivisions may take remedial action when they possess evidence
that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior
discrimination, they must identify that discrimination, public or pri-
vate, with some specificity before they may use race-conscious
relief.
3 11
Finally, applying strict scrutiny, Justice O'Connor found the Richmond
program constitutionally invalid because the 30% set-aside was not nar-
rowly tailored and there was no identified discrimination that would sup-
port a compelling state interest to adopt a race-conscious remedy.31 2
The Richmond program was not colorblind; therefore, it was inherently
suspect.
However, Congress is not limited to combatting particularized
instances of discrimination. Its section 5 powers give it a broad consti-
tutional mandate to eradicate prior discrimination. Therein lies the glar-
ing paradox of Croson-it acknowledged Congress' section 5 power
while taking it away because the notion of colorblindness would lose
much of its vitality if it were limited to the exercise of local or state
power: If race is inherently suspect, without regard to context, then it
was inevitable that Congress would be similarly limited under the doc-
trine of reverse incorporation.1 3 Thus, Croson is the doctrinal precursor
of Adarand.
Racial politics, the central theme of Croson, is premised on color-
blindness. Indeed, what triggered strict scrutiny analysis in Croson was
not the presence of invidious discrimination, but the Court's conception
of majoritarian politics. Following the Court's reasoning, since Blacks
were in the majority politically, they could not be classified as "discrete
and insular minorities. 314
311. Id. at 504.
312. See id. at 506-09.
313. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
314. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (dictum).
1997]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Justice O'Connor noted:
[B]lacks constitute approximately 50% of the population of the city
of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the city council are held by
blacks. The concern that a political majority will more easily act to
the disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or
incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not against, the applica-
tion of heightened [strict] judicial scrutiny in this case.315
Thus, clearly Croson was a decision about pluralistic notions of
process and demands that race not displace the proper functioning of the
process. Ultimately, the virtues of a free flowing political process are
placed above the attainment of substantive equality. In essence, color-
blindness takes on an added twist-race must be ignored because it is
constitutionally irrelevant unless, of course, the political "majority" hap-
pens to be Black-the notion of reverse discrimination was constitution-
alized in Croson.
In Croson, the Court, placing process above reality, settled for
superficial equality:
At the heart of the Court's jurisprudential instability lies a profound
vacillation between two very different notions of equality: equal
access and equal achievement. The equal access construct [as in
Croson] defines equality in terms of the removal of overt barriers to
employment, contracting, housing, voting, and so forth. The equal
achievement construct [as in Metro Broadcasting] goes beyond
removal and adds a compensatory element to make up for the linger-
ing effects of years of societal discrimination.
316
Since racism is an aberration in an otherwise properly functioning
process, judicial review should be employed sparingly or only in those
rare instances where the process has malfunctioned:
[T]he Richmond City Council was controlled by minority group
members. Thus, it was a "minority" majority that voted to enact the
MBE program. This highly unusual fact pattern led the Court to view
the set-aside with great suspicion. Attempting to hoist the proponents
of the equal achievement construct by their own petard, the majority
opinion even quoted Professor Ely: "Of course, it works both ways:
a law that favors Blacks over Whites would be suspect if it were
enacted by a predominantly Black legislature. 31 7
After determining that the process had malfunctioned, the Court
freely ignored the stark realities contained in the legislative history prof-
315. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96.
316. Mary C. Daly, Rebuilding the City of Richmond: Congress's Power to Authorize the
States to Implement Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Plans, 33 B.C. L. REv. 903, 904-05
(1992).
317. Id. at 926.
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fered by the Richmond City Council,3 t8 and insisted on a panoply of
failed race-neutral alternatives.319  Thus, Croson skewed not only
defined boundaries of legislative decisionmaking, but nearly obliterated
the concept of institutional competence. States and localities are now
literally paralyzed from performing their legislative function because the
Fourteenth Amendment now operates as a near absolute prohibition of
remedial efforts, rather than prohibiting discrimination by the states.32 °
Again, Justice Stevens offered a "solution" to the harsh result in
Croson by focusing on future benefits. 32' "In his Croson concurrence
... Justice Stevens repeated his view, which he first articulated in dis-
sent in Wygant, that government units should, in certain circumstances,
be allowed to look forward and adopt racial classifications for non-reme-
dial purposes. ' '322 However, Justice Stevens' forward-looking approach
undercut notions of institutional competence, ignored the far reaching
effects of past discrimination, and selectively addressed the systemic
nature of racial discrimination.
"[A]gree[ing] with the Court's explanation of why the Richmond
ordinance cannot be justified as a remedy for past discrimination,"3 23 he
embraced the process-oriented approach of the majority that emphasizes
mere access rather than substantive equality. 324 Thus, he accepted the
majority's analysis of the factual record in Croson as well as its sum-
mary rejection of the legislative record. 325 This shaped his conception
of institutional competence, and ultimately led him to displace state and
local legislative initiatives. Here, his institutional competence model
was advanced by his focus on three factors: i) the public interest in the
efficient performance of construction contracts; 326 ii) the distinction
between judicial and legislative decisionmaking; 327 and iii) the disparate
318. See id. at 928-29 (cataloguing the evidence of racial discrimination in Richmond,
particularly the fact that the population was 50 percent African-American but only .67 percent of
the public contracts were awarded to minority businesses).
319. See id. at 929-30.
320. See Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the Application of
Strict Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 679 (1995) (noting localities' unwillingness to
implement affirmative action plans following Croson); Katz, supra note 211, at 333 (noting that
under Croson, "even a remedial use of [racial] criteria, so different from the racial barriers at
which the post Civil War amendments were directed, was also strictly limited.").
321. See John Payton, The Meaning and Significance of the Croson Case, 1 GEO. MASON U.
Civ. RTS. L.J. 59, 72 (1990).
322. Id. at 72.
323. Croson, 488 U.S. at 511-12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
324. See Daly, supra note 315, at 904-05 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 302, 304-11 and accompanying text.
326. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 512-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
327. See id. at 513-14.
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impact imposed on the disadvantaged class.32
Distinguishing Wygant, Justice Stevens concluded that "the city
makes no claim that the public interest in the efficient performance of its
construction contracts will be served by granting a preference to minor-
ity-business enterprises. ' 329 To Justice Stevens, Croson was markedly
different from Wygant, where it was "quite obvious . . . that an inte-
grated faculty could provide educational benefits to the entire student
body that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white,
faculty. ' 330 However, this conclusion is not nearly as "obvious" as Jus-
tice Stevens claimed it was. The same argument can be made for Black
economic empowerment: A substantial, qualified body of MBEs, if
included in the public contracting system, could provide benefits to the
entire Richmond community-like the all-white faculty in Wygant, an
all-white or nearly all-white network of contractors does not serve Rich-
mond's diversity or economic interests.
Arguably, Justice Stevens' forward-looking approach is limited and
selective in its reach. While it was "quite obvious" that African-Ameri-
can school teachers were needed in Wygant, it was inexplicably not
obvious that MBEs would contribute to Richmond's public employment
diversity and robust local economy.
Justice Stevens' forward-looking approach instead focused on
access, and race became wholly insignificant: "In the case of public
contracting. . . if we disregard the past, there is not even an arguable
basis for suggesting that the race of a subcontractor or general contractor
should have any relevance to his or her access to the market."'33 1 Yet
this alone does not explain, why the public interest value of inclusion
was weighed more in Wygant than in Croson. Perhaps Justice Stevens
rests the distinction on the fact that there was no hint of racial politics in
Wygant because the race-conscious layoff policy was adopted "with
[the] full participation of the disadvantaged [white school teachers]. 332
Therefore, Justice Stevens could look forward to the future benefit to
African-American students in Wygant because the decision to include
more minority teachers "transcends the harm"333 to the white school
teachers. However, this exception was inapplicable to Croson because
the Richmond MBE program was enacted by a "minority-majority" city
council and attempted to eradicate past discrimination.
The forward-looking approach is ahistorical; and as a result, Justice
328. See id. at 514-18.
329. Id. at 512.
330. Id. at 512.
331. Id. at 512-13.
332. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 320.
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Stevens is forced to select which cases will most appropriately fit his
analytical framework: Wygant fits because whites were involved in the
decision to "harm" themselves whereas Croson does not fit because the
majority African-American city council chose the "harm" which
threatened "innocent" whites. 334  This illustrates the fallacy of an
approach that ignores history. Both Wygant and Croson present under-
lying facts that clearly illustrate embedded systems of caste.335 Yet, by
ignoring the history of discrimination in both cases and by defining
harm on the basis of the disadvantaged race, Justice Stevens skewed his
notion of inclusion. Therefore, "inclusion" means one thing in Wygant
and something quite different in Croson.
Thus, Justice Stevens missed an important public interest dimen-
sion of the remedial efforts initiated by the City of Richmond: "Argua-
bly, attention to societal discrimination would expand the relevant pool
of black candidates. Thus, in Croson the issue would not be the per-
centage of contracting dollars received by existing MBEs, but rather the
extent to which discrimination elsewhere blocked the formation of
MBEs.' 336
Addressing the distinction between judicial and legislative deci-
sionmaking, Justice Stevens made a bold statement in Croson-the judi-
cial system is better equipped than the legislatures to identify past
wrongdoers and fashion remedies.337 The appropriate sphere for gov-
ernmental conduct is thus limited to the promulgation of rules to govern
future conduct: "This litigation involves an attempt by a legislative
body, rather than a court, to fashion a remedy for a past wrong. Legisla-
tures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulgate rules to govern
future conduct." 338  Moreover, Justice Stevens invoked the Constitu-
tion's prohibition against ex post facto laws, and bills of attainder, and in
334. Professor Aleinikoff writes:
[I]n a perverse way, the extent of previous discrimination works against blacks:
because past societal racial discrimination is recognized by all, virtually any
program could be justified by reference to it and illicit, self-dealing motives could
thereby be hidden.
[The apparent assumption that any program adopted by black elected officials to
help black entrepreneurs is an exercise in self-dealing seems to violate the
colorblind principles under which the Justices profess to be operating.
Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 1102.
335. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 297-98 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Aleinikoff, supra note
16, at 1073-74 (summarizing the history of invidious discrimination in Richmond, Virginia, the
former cradle of the Confederacy).
336. Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 1099.
337. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-14 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
338. See id. at 513.
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so doing indicts the action of the Richmond City Council. 339 Thus, to
Justice Stevens, the Richmond City Council acted well outside its proper
sphere.
This approach limits governmental power and substitutes the
Court's judgment, on inherently local matters, for sound legislative deci-
sionmaking. Clearly, if a governmental enactment is noninvidious, the
Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature. The
Fourteenth Amendment is a prohibition on discrimination, not a ceiling
on positive governmental efforts to eradicate caste:
A legislature which adopts affirmative action guidelines might have
any of a number of legitimate goals: rectifying past discrimination,
assuring that there are role models within particular professions, etc.
None of these involve an attempt to impose a stigma or assert the
inferiority of the disadvantaged group. A legislature which adopts
discriminatory measures against a minority is presumably trying to
impose a stigma or assert the dominant group's superiority. While
the former group of goals is quite compatible with (and indeed sup-
ports) the ideals reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment, the latter set
is incompatible with those goals. By equating these two practices,
the court obfuscates an important difference between them.
340
This obfuscation makes it easy for the Court to trammel principled
legislative efforts to achieve substantive equality. Indeed, Justice Ste-
vens' assertion of reverse institutional competence-that the Court is
better equipped to remedy past discrimination-obscured the bright line
of distinct state-federal roles that he would later attempt to draw in
Adarand.3 4 '
Finally, Justice Stevens, as he has since his dissent in Wygant,
eschewed the traditional, multi-tiered equal protection analysis
employed by the Court and instead adopted an analysis focusing on "the
characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged classes that may
justify their disparate treatment. '342 Thus, Justice Stevens employed
some of the myths343 underlying the affirmative action debate in order to
concur in the invalidation of the Richmond program:
[T]he composition of the disadvantaged class of white contractors
presumably includes some who have been guilty of unlawful discrim-
ination, some who practiced discrimination before it was forbidden
by law, and some who have never discriminated against anyone on
the basis of race. Imposing a common burden on such a disparate
339. See id. at 513-14.
340. Strasser, supra note 272, at 401-02.
341. See infra notes 393-07 and accompanying text.
342. 488 U.S. at 514 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
343. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
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class merely because each member of the class is of the same race
stems from reliance on a stereotype rather than fact or reason.
Buttressing the assertion above is the notion of racial patronage.345
This rationale utilizes colorblindness to turn the Fourteenth Amendment
on its head-African-American city officials are now the oppressors.
Arguably, this use of colorblindness undermines legislative power,
ignores institutional competence, and perpetuates caste:
This approach maligns the integrity of African-American city offi-
cials by insinuating that because they are African-American, they are
not capable of making fair decisions. It insults their intellectual abil-
ity by implying that they cannot properly define the kind of discrimi-
nation that merits racial preferences, despite the fact that they
probably have been the victims of such discrimination themselves
and can, therefore, define it all too well. Ironically, such misguided
judgments about the aptitudes of African-American city officials
amounts to the kind of racism which the set-asides attempt to elimi-
nate. It is this same racism which the Court fears that African-Amer-
ican majorities may be manifesting when they enact racial
preferences that benefit their own race.346
Justice Stevens' forward-looking approach clearly embraces form
over substance allowing him to advance a formulaic view of equality
that severely limits legislative decisionmaking. While he did not explic-
itly adopt the Croson majority's use of strict scrutiny analysis premised
on the "numerical superiority" 347 of African-Americans in the Richmond
City Council, he nevertheless, reached the same conclusion by focusing
on the harm imposed on the disadvantaged class. Under either rationale,
clearly defined notions of institutional competence are summarily
discarded:
This approach ignores the principle that local government officials,
regardless of race, are, by virtue of their proximity to and their exper-
tise with local affairs, exceptionally well-qualified to make determi-
nations of public good concerning the award of public contracts
within their spheres of authority. Courts should not be in the position
of managing the everyday affairs of local governments. Instead, it is
within the purview of local government to decide to step in and pre-
vent private industry from practicing racial discrimination.
348
The forward-looking approach is merely a variation on colorblind
344. Croson, 488 U.S. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
345. See id. at 516 n.9.
346. Cassandra D. Hart, Unresolved Tensions: The Croson Decision, 7 HARV. BLACKLETTER
J. 71, 84-5 (1990); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 1105-06 and accompanying text.
347. Hart, supra note 346, at 85.
348. Id.; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 1105-07 (noting how colorblindness obscures
meaningful analysis of the different power relations facing white and black politicians).
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constitutionlism-it ignores race only when it is convenient to do so-
explaining the varying outcomes under Justice Stevens' approach.
4. METRO BROADCASTING: JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE:
DIVERSITY AS A LEGITIMATE GOAL
In Metro Broadcasting,349 Justice Stevens embraced race as a factor
in reaching future diversity. Metro Broadcasting is significant on sev-
eral levels: it was Justice Brennan's final decision before his retirement
from the Court; it was the last decision in which the Court employed
intermediate scrutiny to evaluate congressionally enacted racial prefer-
ences; and Justice Stevens is the sole member of the Metro Broadcasting
majority still on the Court.350
In Metro Broadcasting, applicants for broadcast licenses alleged
that FCC policies favoring minority firms violated the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. Under one policy, the FCC consid-
ered "minority ownership as one factor in comparative proceedings for
new licenses."35' Under the other "distress sale" policy, an exception
was created to the general rule that "a licensee whose qualifications to
hold a broadcast license [came] into question may not assign or transfer
that license until the FCC resolved its doubts in a noncomparative hear-
ing. ' 352 The exception "allow[ed] a broadcaster whose license has been
designated for a revocation hearing, or whose renewal application has
been designated for hearing, to assign the license to an FCC-approved
minority enterprise. '353 In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Brennan,
the Court upheld both policies:
We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Con-
gress-even if those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of
being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or socie-
tal discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent that
they serve important governmental objectives within the power of
Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.354
Reaffirming Fullilove and adopting middle-tier scrutiny, the Court
explicitly acknowledged the uniqueness of congressional power in eradi-
cating racial discrimination. Metro Broadcasting clearly distinguished
349. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
350. "Justice Stevens was the only Justice to join the judgment of the Court in Croson, and the
majority opinion in Metro Broadcasting," Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 1061-62 n.10 (citations
omitted).
351. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547, 556-57.
352. Id. at 557.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 564-65 (emphasis added).
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between invidious and noninvidious governmental action.355 Conclud-
ing that the FCC minority ownership policies passed constitutional mus-
ter, the Court stated that the policies "serve the important governmental
objective of broadcast diversity" 3 6 and that "they are substantially
related to the achievement of that objective. '357 Drawing upon Justice
Powell's decision in Bakke and Justice Stevens' dissent in Wygant, the
Court determined that:
[T]he interest in enhancing broadcast diversity is, at the very least, an
important governmental objective and is therefore a sufficient basis
for the Commission's minority ownership policies. Just as a "diverse
student body" contributing to a "robust exchange of ideas" is a "con-
stitutionally permissible goal" on which a race-conscious university
admissions program may be predicated... the diversity of views and
information on the airwaves serves important First Amendment
values.358
Relying upon the legislative history of Congress and the FCC,3
the Court also concluded that the policies were substantially related to
the achievement of the government's objective:
The judgment that there is a link between expanded minority owner-
ship and broadcast diversity does not rest on impermissible stereotyp-
ing .... Rather, both Congress and the FCC maintain simply that
expanded minority ownership of broadcast outlets will, in the aggre-
gate, result in greater broadcast diversity. A broadcasting industry
with representative minority participation will produce more varia-
tion and diversity than will one whose ownership is drawn from a
single racially and ethically homogenous group.
360
Moreover, the minority ownership policies were found to be "appropri-
ately limited in extent and duration, and subject to reassessment and
reevaluation by the Congress prior to any extension or re-enactment."
361
Finally, noting the impact on nonminorities, the Court concluded that
the burden was "slight. ' 362 Specifically, because there was "no settled
expectation that [nonminority] applications [would] be granted without
consideration of public interest factors such as minority ownership,"
3 63
355. See id. at 564 n.12 (rejecting Justice Kennedy's view that there is no difference between
benign race-conscious remedies and South African apartheid, the "separate-but-equal" doctrine of
Plessy, and the internment of Japanese Americans in Korematsu).
356. Id. at 566.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 568 (citations omitted).
359. See id. at 569-600.
360. Id. at 579.
361. Id. at 594 (quoting Fuililove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 489 (1980)).
362. Id. at 597.
363. Id.
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the policies did not contravene any protected rights or interests.36
Metro Broadcasting represents a clear articulation of the parame-
ters of congressional power-section 5 is a positive grant of legislative
power. According the FCC policies the appropriate level of deference,
the Court correctly found that enacting the policies was a constitutional
exercise of congressional power.365 Significantly, Congress was not leg-
islating to eradicate a system of state discrimination, rather, pursuant to
its unique fact-finding powers as the national legislature, it was legislat-
ing on its own initiative to dismantle systems of caste. The essence of
congressional power is that, in the absence of invidious governmental
conduct underlying a particular legislative initiative, section 5 is not lim-
ited by equal protection principles:
Put another way, the Court in both Croson and Fullilove read section
five to confer upon Congress not only the authority to remedy equal
protection violations identified by the Court but also the authority to
define what constitutes an equal protection violation. As these deci-
sions indicate, this interpretation of section five forecloses meaning-
ful application of the equal protection component of the fifth
amendment. It is difficult if not impossible for the Court to impose
an equal protection limitation upon Congress while simultaneously
allowing Congress' power to define the scope of the equal protection
clause when it legislates under section five. This is perhaps best
shown in Metro Broadcasting, where Justice Brennan framed the
question as "whether [the FCC policies] violate the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment," but devoted no further attention
either to the content of the equal protection component or to its rela-
tionship to section five.366
Indeed, in the absence of invidious discrimination by Congress
itself, there was no need for a further explanation-the FCC policies
were squarely within the ambit of Congress' constitutionally mandated
powers. Thus, Metro Broadcasting is doctrinally distinct from Bolling
v. Sharpe.3 67 Yet the flaw in the Court's reasoning in Metro Broadcast-
ing was that while it recognized the broad deferential standard accorded
Congress in Fullilove, it never clarified the boundaries of that standard.
Congressional power was left "unchecked," and this inevitably led to a
dissent by Justice O'Connor which became the majority opinion in
Adarand.36 s
364. See id.
365. See id. at 564-65.
366. Edward D. Rogers, 24 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 117, 150 (1990) (alteration in
original). This is precisely why Justice O'Connor invents the doctrine of congruence-the Court
is then free to analyze a federal legislative initiative under the highest level of judicial scrutiny.
367. See supra notes 159-78 and accompanying text.
368. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 602-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (narrowly
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It is particularly interesting that Justice Stevens did not, in any way,
attempt to define congressional power under section 5. The views he
later expressed in his Adarand dissent36 9 would have been particularly
useful in his Metro Broadcasting concurrence. Instead, he returned to
the familiar theme of future benefits, and offered no explanation of why
Metro Broadcasting was different from Fullilove. Thus, it is unclear
why he dissented in Fullilove and concurred in Metro Broadcasting.
Perhaps the distinction is that in Fullilove, there was no articulation of a
forward-looking policy; while in Metro Broadcasting, diversity was
regarded as the future benefit of the policies: "The public interest in
broadcast diversity like the interest in an integrated police force, diver-
sity in the composition of a public school faculty or diversity in the
student body of a professional school-is . . . unquestionably
legitimate. '"370
Again, this illustrates the selective nature of Justice Stevens'
approach and its affect on institutional power:
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Metro portends trouble for
federal affirmative action programs that cannot be tied to a concern
for "diversity" of ideas and information. Justice Stevens is generally
unimpressed with backward-looking remedial justifications ....
Unless a program can be explained as an attempt to enlighten the
public on issues of race, it is not likely to win the vote of Justice
Stevens .... 371
Justice Stevens' concurrence narrowly cabined congressional
power to select situations where the pursuit of a forward-looking remedy
is "unquestionably legitimate":
Justice Stevens is a fan of diversity but is highly skeptical'of other
affirmative action goals . . . . Justice Stevens dissented from the
upholding of the federal construction set-asides in Fullilove, and he
joined the majority in striking down Richmond's program for minor-
ity contractors. Twice in his short concurring opinion in Metro, Jus-
tice Stevens uses the word "extremely." The situations for which
race will provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment are
"extremely rare"; the category of permissible race-based classifica-
construing section 5 and concluding that Metro Broadcasting is not a section 5 case because
Congress is not acting with respect to the states); see also Douglas 0. Linder, Review of
Affirmative Action After Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C.: The Solution Almost Nobody Wanted, 59
UMKC L. REv. 293, 295-97 (1991) (noting the doctrinal weaknesses of Metro Broadcasting).
Justice Brennan's Metro Broadcasting opinion embraces a lower standard of review when
Congress is exercising an amalgam of its constitutionally mandated powers. 497 U.S. at 564-65;
accord Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
369. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2126 (1990).
370. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 601-02 (Stevens, J., concurring).
371. Linder, supra note 368, at 318.
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tions is "extremely narrow." Broadcast diversity is one of the
"extremely rare" situations where Justice Stevens would allow race-
based classifications.372
Interestingly, Justice Stevens' forward-looking approach is better
suited analytically to the Metro Broadcasting decision if it is viewed as
a First Amendment case. If the concern is simply access to the ideologi-
cal marketplace, then the diversity interest that Justice Stevens viewed
as legitimate is well-served-a variety of viewpoints will be added to
the cultural marketplace.373 The marketplace will be open to all, includ-
ing those who have been traditionally shut out. But access, even in the
theoretical paradigm of the marketplace of ideas, is rarely enough. 374
B. Affirmative Inaction: The Emergence of the Inverted Strict
Scrutiny Standard
In Adarand, the Court, for the first time, held congressional action
to the same level of strict judicial scrutiny as aplied to states and locali-
ties. Thus, Croson has been federalized-city councils, state legisla-
tures, and Congress are now on the same constitutional plane. The
allure of doctrinal uniformity and colorblindness has shifted the focus
from the pursuit of equality to contrived doctrines of skepticism, consis-
tency, and congruence. Further, stare decisis is ignored, the Fourteenth
Amendment is turned inside out and consequently an inverted strict
scrutiny emerges-the question is not whether a particular governmental
enactment is invidious, it is whether it is based on race. Thus, Adarand
precludes any analysis into the systemic underpinnings of racism;
indeed, it has already spawned what will be a cynical legacy of color-
blind jurisprudence.375
1. THE O'CONNOR MAJORITY
In 1989, the Central Federal Lands Highway Division (CFLHD), a
division of the United States Department of Transportation, awarded a
price contract for a highway guardrail construction project to Mountain
Gravel and Construction Company ("Mountain Gravel"). 376 "Adarand,
372. Id.
373. See Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping In Singular
Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525, 537 (1990).
374. See Powell, supra note 30.
375. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the University of
Texas School of Law's interests in achieving a racially diverse student body and in eliminating the
present effects of past discrimination were not sufficiently compelling to justify the law school's
use of race as a factor in the student admissions process). The Fifth Circuit relied on Adarand to
reach this dubious result.
376. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2102 (1995).
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a Colorado-based highway construction company specializing in guard-
rail work, submitted the low bid,"377 and Mountain Gravel awarded the
subcontract to Gonzales Construction Company, a Disadvantaged Busi-
ness Enterprise ("DBE") that had submitted a somewhat higher bid.378
Adarand filed suit and was unsuccessful in both the district court
and the Tenth Circuit: the district court disposed of Adarand's Fifth
Amendment claim by granting summary judgment in favor of the Gov-
ernment; and the Tenth Circuit, applying intermediate scrutiny, held that
the subcontracting program was narrowly tailored to achieve its impor-
tant purpose of benefitting small disadvantaged businesses. 379  The
Supreme Court took a drastically different approach to the DBE
program.
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion advanced three central tenets:
(i) skepticism (race is inherently suspect and should be viewed skepti-
cally); (ii) consistency (an injured party's race is irrelevant-the Four-
teenth Amendment demands the equal treatment of all races); and (iii)
congruence (equal protection under the Fifth Amendment and equal pro-
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment mean the same thing; there-
fore, local, state, and federal race-conscious remedial measures are all
subject to strict scrutiny).
a. Skepticism
In order to establish the new doctrine of skepticism in analyzing
benign race-conscious remedies, Justice O'Connor rejected the institu-
tional model she had embraced in Croson380 and instead relied on an
expansive reading of Croson: although Croson did not implicate Con-
377. Id.
378. See id. "The contract in Adarand was formed as a result of the Surface Transportation
and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (the "STURAA"). The STURAA reserves at
least ten percent of funding for Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBEs) as defined by the
Small Business Act. As a recipient of federal highway funds, the CFLHD used a Subcontracting
Compensation Clause ("SCC") program. Under federal regulations promulgated in response to
STURAA, a DBE is defined as a small business that is at least fifty-one percent owned and
managed by disadvantaged individuals." Terrence M. Lewis, Comment, Standard of Review
Under the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Component: Adarand Expands the Application of
Strict Scrutiny, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 325, 326-27 (1996) (citations omitted).
379. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1992), aff'd sub.
nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995); see also Lewis, supra note 378, at 328.
380. In her opinion for the Court in Croson, Justice O'Connor acknowledged and relied on
Congress' unique powers in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, Justice O'Connor
even cited Katzenbach v. Morgan for the proposition that, under section 5, Congress has a positive
grant of legislative power "to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Croson, 488 U.S. at 490. This is
precisely what Congress did in Adarand; however, Justice O'Connor never offered an explanation
for her abandonment of this conception of institutional power.
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gress' section 5 powers, it articulated a uniform standard of strict scru-
tiny for all race-based remedial efforts. Thus, O'Connor declared that
Metro Broadcasting was a doctrinal aberration:
[Metro Broadcasting] turned its back on Croson's explanation of why
strict scrutiny of all governmental racial classifications is essential:
"Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-
based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifi-
cations are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics .... We adhere to that view today, despite the surface appeal
of holding 'benign' racial classifications to a lower standard, because
'it may not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact
benign."'
38 1
Again, colorblindness constricted the boundaries of legislative
power-racial classifications are inherently suspect so that any use of
race is presumptively unconstitutional. Here, the fear of racial poli-
tics 382 was extended beyond programs passed by minority-majority city
councils to those adopted by Congress as well. Justice O'Connor moved
from scrutinizing the racial composition of the Richmond City Council
in Croson to proscribing the use of race as a factor in congressional
decisionmaking. In both cases, the Court was blinded by color and
viewed racial classifications as used not to achieve the aspirational goal
of equality, but to perpetuate caste.
b. Consistency
In response to Justice Stevens' assertion, in dissent, that the major-
ity's conception of consistency "ignores the difference . . . between a
'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat. '3 83 Justice O'Connor stated
that "[c]onsistency does recognize that any individual suffers an injury
when he or she is disadvantaged by the government because of his or her
race, whatever that race may be."'384 However, while Justice O'Connor
unified state and federal race-conscious remedies under one analytical
standard, she failed to define the parameters of Congress' section 5 pow-
ers. 385 Clearly, Justice O'Connor could offer no brightline because to do
so would have acknowledged Congress' unique section 5 powers and
significantly weakened her notion of congruence.
381. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112 (citations omitted).
382. See supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
383. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120, 2121.
384. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114.
385. See id. Justice O'Connor noted that various members of the Court have taken different
views of Congress' section 5 powers, but left open the question of judicial deference to such
power. See id.
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c. Congruence
Justice O'Connor concluded that Metro Broadcasting was a depar-
ture from deeply-rooted principles of congruence:
Metro Broadcasting squarely rejected one of the three propositions
established by the Court's earlier equal protection cases, namely,
congruence between the standards applicable to federal and state
racial classifications, and in so doing also undermined the other
two-skepticism of all racial classifications, and consistency of treat-
ment irrespective of the race of the burdened or benefited group.
Under Metro Broadcasting, certain racial classifications ("benign"
ones enacted by the federal government) should be treated less skep-
tically than others; and the race of the benefitted group is critical to
the determination of which standard of review to apply. Metro
Broadcasting was thus a significant departure from much of what had
come before it.
3 86
The Court sidestepped the doctrine of stare decisis: "Metro Broad-
casting's untenable distinction between state and federal racial classifi-
cations lacks support in our precedent, and undermines the fundamental
principle of equal protection as a personal right. In this case, as between
that principle and 'its later misapplications,' the principle must pre-
vail." 38 7  There is a stark irony here: the Court constructs, from
wholecloth, three new "doctrines" of constitutional interpretation and
then invalidated Metro Broadcasting by invoking these new principles
as well-settled propositions in its equal protection jurisprudence.
Concluding that the same standard of judicial scrutiny applied
under both Fifth and Fourteenth amendments when evaluating racial
classifications,3"8 the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting and held that
strict scrutiny applied to "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state, or local governmental actor. '389 That this uniformity is
superficial, is belied by the fact that the Court never articulated what
factors would suffice to satisfy the requisite compelling governmental
interest, nor does the Court offer any guidance as to how a race-based
remedial approach can be narrowly tailored.390 Instead, the Court sim-
ply remanded the case while noting that strict scrutiny is not necessarily
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact. ' 391 This pledge is not reassuring.
386. Id. at 2112 (citations omitted).
387. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
388. See id. at 2107-08, 2112-13.
389. Id. at 2113. While not explicitly overruling Fullilove, the Court held that the deferential
approach is no longer controlling. Id. at 2117.
390. Id. See also Duncan, supra note 320, at 682. (discussing Croson's failure to sufficiently
articulate what is a compelling governmental interest).
391. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
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Recall that the Court's infamous decision in Korematsu v. United
States392 is the best known and only instance where a race-based invidi-
ous governmental program has withstood strict judicial scrutiny.
393
2. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT: SKEPTICAL SCRUTINY
Justice Stevens' dissent offered an effective critique of the New
Equal Protection. However, his approach was still limited,394 focusing
primarily on the forward-looking aspects of the DBE program to distin-
guish Adarand from his earlier dissent in Fullilove. Nevertheless, he
answered the question the majority took great pains to avoid-he
defined congressional power under section 5.
a. Skepticism and Illusory Uniformity
Justice Stevens exposed the heart of the matter in Adarand-doctri-
nal "uniformity" should not displace thoughtful analysis of issues that
touch on the very essence of equality: "[B]ecause uniform standards are
often anything but uniform, we should evaluate the Court's comments
on 'consistency,' 'congruence,' and stare decisis with the same type of
skepticism that the Court advocates for the underlying issue. 39 5
Indeed, the doctrinal "uniformity" the majority heralded as the
defining feature of its equal protection jurisprudence, is illusory. In
fact, the majority manipulated precedent and created a new standard
obliterating a once clear line between invidious and noninvidious gov-
emmental conduct. As a result, congressional power under section 5
was further undercut.
Although Justice Stevens dissented in Fullilove, he never ques-
tioned the primacy of Congress' enforcement powers under the Civil
War Amendments.396 Similarly, his dissent in Adarand recognized the
breadth of Congress' remedial power to end discrimination. He stated,
that while a court "should be wary of a governmental decision that relies
upon a racial classification, 397 it does not follow that Congress' reme-
dial power should be summarily undercut by the Court's skepticism.
398
392. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
393. See Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme Court
Moves from Approving Internment of Japanese Americans to Disapproving Affirmative Action for
African Americans, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 165, 183 (1996) ("[Ihe Adarand opinion provides the
foundation for a subsequent case which could follow Korematsu not only in its reasoning, but also
in its result.").
394. See supra notes 265-70, 296-302, 337-53, 372-76, and accompanying text.
395. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
396. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 548 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
397. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
398. See id. at 2125. Justice Stevens noted that the Court's precedents had explicitly
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Thus, the Court's notions of "consistency" and "congruence" were
inherently flawed.
b. Consistent Inconsistencies
Rejecting the majority's conception of consistency, Justice Stevens
argued that there was a significant difference "between a decision by the
majority to impose a special burden on the members of a minority race
and a decision by the majority to provide a benefit to certain members of
the minority notwithstanding its incidental burden on some members of
the majority. 399
Here, as he did in Wygant,400 Justice Stevens readily acknowledged
the fact that, in the pursuit of equality, some members of the majority
will have to bear the burden when race-conscious remedial approaches
are employed.410 However, there is a clear difference between this inci-
dental "burden" and invidious discrimination that perpetuates racial
caste:
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that
is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradi-
cate racial subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of
oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain
the power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect
the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society.4"2
Justice Stevens further underscored the inconsistencies inherent in
the Court's doctrine of consistency-the Court treated fundamental dif-
ferences as similarities:
The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the differ-
ence between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat. It would
treat a Dixiecrat Senator's decision to vote against Thurgood Mar-
shall's confirmation in order to keep African Americans off the
Supreme Court on a par with President Johnson's evaluation of his
nominee's race as a positive factor .... An interest in "consistency"
does not justify treating differences as though they were
similarities.
4 °3
Thus, Justice Stevens recognized that it is possible to distinguish
between invidious and noninvidious discrimination, and that the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence demands this analysis.404
recognized the unique powers of Congress and accorded the exercise of those powers significant
deference. See id.
399. Id. at 2120.
400. See supra notes 286-88 and accompanying text.
401. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 2121.
404. See id. at 2121-22.
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The glaring inconsistency of the Court's "consistent" approach is
graphically illustrated by the ad hoc nature of its multi-tiered equal pro-
tection analysis. Justice Stevens highlighted this doctrinal flaw:
[A]s the law currently stands, the Court will apply "intermediate
scrutiny" to cases of invidious gender discrimination and "strict scru-
tiny" to cases of invidious race discrimination, while applying the
same standard for benign classifications as for invidious ones. If this
remains the law, then today's lecture about "consistency" will pro-
duce the anomalous result that the Government can more easily enact
affirmative-action programs to remedy discrimination against women
than it can enact affirmative-action programs to remedy discrimina-
tion against African-Americans--even though the primary purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause was to end discrimination against the
former slaves .... When a court becomes preoccupied with abstract
standards, it risks sacrificing common sense at the altar of formal
consistency.4 °5
c. The Incongruity of Congruence
Moreover, the Court's preoccupation with formal consistency led it
to construct the doctrine of congruence. If race is to be viewed skepti-
cally, and if there is no difference between ameliorative action and
caste-based discrimination, then governments should be substantially
constrained in their adoption of race-conscious remedies. For purposes
of constitutional analysis, Congress is constrained in much the same way
as the local city council is when race is a component of the remedial
framework. Justice Stevens forcefully rejected this view.40 6
In Croson, the Court imposed its own view of polity on the Rich-
mond MBE program-the result was a substantial dilution of state and
local governmental power. Adarand completed the trend of curtail-
ment-congressional governmental initiatives are now also subjected to
strict scrutiny whenever race is implicated. The doctrine of congruence
served as the bridge to link the distinct spheres of state and federal
power. Clearly, state power is explicitly limited by section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment: no state shall deny its citizens the equal protec-
tion of the laws. However, section 1 says nothing about, nor does it
serve as a prohibition on, voluntary, nonvidious state remedial efforts
adopted in the spirit of equality that is the touchstone of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The doctrine of congruence obscured this bedrock principle-Con-
gress' section 5 power to adopt race-conscious noninvidious remedies is
subjected to the same level of scrutiny as invidious state discrimination
405. Id. at 2122 (citations omitted).
406. See id. at 2124.
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would be under section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is a
flawed approach because section 5 is not framed as a limitation on con-
gressional power. Of course, Congress cannot discriminate on the basis
of race, the Fifth Amendment and Bolling make this abundantly clear.
But "congruence" must not mean that positive remedial efforts, by Con-
gress, are constitutionally prohibited.4 °7 Justice Stevens addressed this
issue emphasizing Justice Scalia's concurrence and Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion in Croson where both Justices explicitly acknowledged
the distinct differences between section 5's positive grant of power to
Congress and section l's prohibition against unconstitutional discrimi-
nation by the states."'
Drawing upon conceptions of institutional competence and defer-
ence to a co-equal branch of government, Justice Stevens concluded:
In the programs challenged in this case, Congress has acted both with
respect to private individuals and, as in Fullilove, with respect to the
States themselves. When Congress does this, it draws its power
directly from § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment .... The Fourteenth
Amendment directly empowers Congress at the same time it
expressly limits the states. This is no accident. It represents our
Nation's consensus, achieved after hard experience throughout our
sorry history of race relations, that the Federal Government must be
the primary defender of racial minorities against the States, some of
which may be inclined to oppress such minorities. A rule of "congru-
ence" that ignores a purposeful "incongruity" so fundamental to our
system of government is unacceptable.40 9
Concluding that Fullilove governed the result in Adarand and that
the DBE program focused on economic status with race as a positive
factor, Justice Stevens would have affirmed the Tenth Circuit's judg-
ment that the program passed constitutional muster. 10  Notably,
Adarand fits neatly into Justice Stevens' forward-looking approach:
"This program, then, if in part a remedy for past discrimination, is most
importantly a forward-looking response to practical problems faced by
minority subcontractors." 4 ' This was a crucial distinction for Justice
Stevens-Adarand can be justified as forward-looking because the
underlying DBE program focused on economic status while Fullilove
was more akin to racial patronage.
While Justice Stevens offered an approach, employing past cases,
to preserve governmental power, he was unsuccessful in addressing the
407. See supra notes 159-70, 180-81 and accompanying text.
408. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2124-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
409. Id. at 2126.
410. See id. at 2128-31.
411. Id. at 2129.
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systemic nature of racism. His forward-looking approach again only
addressed access, not substantive past discrimination, and his focus on
the future threatens to limit governmental remedial efforts to only a por-
tion of discrimination. While this is certainly better than the majority's
approach, it was nevertheless limited-it was acontextual and
ahistorical.
3. FLEXIBLE SCRUTINY
Flexible scrutiny provides a viable doctrinal alternative. Specifi-
cally, if governmental conduct is noninvidious and benefits a tradition-
ally oppressed minority, then such affirmative efforts should be subject
to intermediate scrutiny. States and localities that undertake positive
ameliorative efforts above the prohibitory floor embodied in section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment should be afforded deference; and Congress,
when it acts pursuant to its section 5 powers, should be afforded substan-
tial deference commensurate with its status as a co-equal branch of gov-
ernment. Flexible scrutiny recognizes separate spheres of governmental
power while unifying these spheres under one standard-intermediate
scrutiny.
Moreover, flexible scrutiny avoids the anomaly that Justice Stevens
pinpointed in his Adarand dissent 4 t2-Government affirmative action
programs for minorities and women would be reviewed under the same
standard.4"3 Of course, there are differences in the history of oppression
visited upon minorities and women, but this analysis could be factored
into the question of whether the governmental conduct was invidious.
The question would be for race cases, as it is for gender cases: "[is
there] some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike."
41 4
In Croson and in Adarand, there was a reason to prefer minority
contractors over their majority counterparts-a history of rampant dis-
crimination with present day effects. In situations where minorities are
not similarly situated, the government should be free not only to provide
access, but substantive equality. If the Court can reject genderblindness,
it certainly can and should reject colorblindness.415
Thus, the flexible scrutiny analysis would ask three questions: i)
412. See id. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's approach will lead to
disparate results-racial issues will be determined under the strict scrutiny prong while gender
issues will be resolved under the intermediate scrutiny prong).
413. See generally Comment, Gender-Based Affirmative Action: Where Does It Fit in the
Tiered Scheme of Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 41 KAN. L. REv. 591 (1991).
414. See Fair, supra note 11, at 73.
415. See id. at 73-81.
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are Blacks and whites similarly situated? ii) does the statute serve
important governmental objectives? and iii) are the discriminatory
means employed by the government substantially related to the achieve-
ment of the objectives?416 Appropriate deference would be the guiding
principle under intermediate scrutiny-state and local legislative fact
finding would be accorded due weight. Section 1 would still stand as a
bar to state or local-sponsored discrimination; however, noninvidious
governmental conduct in this sphere would not be summarily struck
down.
Under flexible scrutiny, an analogous argument can be made when
Congress exercises its section 5 powers. The Fifth Amendment would
serve as a bar to discrimination by the federal government, 4" but where
the congressional program is noninvidious, section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment would not be employed to cramp federal power. In other
words, intermediate scrutiny would apply to the local, state, and federal
governmental spheres where the government is pursuing the dictates of
equality embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.
There is a policing mechanism in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments; namely, Congress has the responsibility to enforce these
amendments by appropriate legislation. Thus, Congress fills the gap
where the states have acted to undermine equality; however, enforce-
ment also encompasses Congress' inherent power, as the national legis-
lature, to initiate legislation that will remove systems of caste. 8
Conversely, where states and localities are acting in accord with the con-
stitutional mandate of equality, their power to do so should not be lim-
ited by section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Croson and Adarand
were wrongly decided because the Court ignored this principle.
Finally, Justice Marshall offered a useful framework for flexible
scrutiny analysis. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,4"9 Ply-
ler v. Doe,420 and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez,421 he adopted a flexible approach to equal protection analysis.
422
416. See id. at 80.
417. See supra Part II B.
418. See Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress
Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029
(1993) (arguing that Congress has broad powers under section 5 and noting that the ratchet theory
is consistent with this view); see also supra Part II B.
419. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
420. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
421. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
422. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 455-78 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230-31
(1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Specifically, Justice Marshall noted a clear line between section I's pro-
hibition against state discrimination and the positive grant of power to
Congress in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
To the degree that this parsimonious standard [strict scrutiny] is
grounded on a view that either § 1 or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantially disempowered states and localities from remedy-
ing past discrimination ... the majority is seriously mistaken ....
Certainly Fullilove did not view § 5 either as limiting the tradition-
ally broad police powers of the States to fight discrimination, or as
mandating a zero-sum game in which state power wanes as federal
power waxes.423
Flexible scrutiny recognizes that section 1 is a prohibition against
discrimination, as such, it does not limit positive governmental efforts-
local, state, or federal-to eliminate racial subordination. States and
localities are free to go beyond the negative proscription against state-
sponsored discrimination; they can actively seek to eradicate the vestiges
of past discrimination. Indeed, if states and localities adopt this
approach, they are merely embracing the letter and spirit of section 1.
More importantly, Congress is not limited to the exercise of the "police
power" component of its section 5 powers. Justice Marshall recognized
the breadth of section 5: "[W]e [have] held that § 5 'is a positive grant
of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Congress has this authority even
where no constitutional violation has been found. '4 24
The Court simply went the wrong way in its Croson and Adarand
decisions and significantly undermined governmental power in the name
of uniformity. Instead, the Court should have embraced noninvidious
remedial efforts as a sign that one day we will reach the colorblind soci-
ety that it has already constitutionalized. As Justice Marshall declared in
Croson, "[There is] no reason to conclude that the States cannot volunta-
rily accomplish under § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment what Congress
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment may authorize or compel either
the states or private persons to do."425 The same argument is even more
compelling when Congress exercises its section 5 powers-Congress
has a constitutional duty to eradicate caste. This is precisely what it had
attempted in Adarand.
423. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 557-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 224 and accompanying text.
424. Croson, 488 U.S. at 557 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 651 (1966)) (citation omitted).
425. Id. at 559 (alteration in original).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court is blinded by color. Rather than acknowledging race as
a positive factor in eradicating caste, the Court recognizes race only to
ignore it. Colorblindness is employed to maintain a status quo based on
the exploitation of oppressed minorities, and any meaningful discourse
is subverted by a panoply of disconcerting labels and stereotypes. The
New Equal Protection-where any use of race is presumptively uncon-
stitutional-will usher in a period of affirmative inaction and cynical
judicial pronouncements which ignore the present effects of centuries of
subjugation. In so doing, the Court has restructured the boundaries of
legislative power-we have come "full circle"426 returning to the roots
of our sorry history of racial discrimination.
426. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 402 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting).
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